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As our lives become more digitized, as we interact with our digital devices on a more 
regular basis, as we see information about ourselves being tracked, recorded and distributed 
across all kinds of platforms, many of us are increasingly concerned about privacy. 
While surfing the net, the user must give consent to a multitude of pages, accept 
cookies (most of the time without reading the terms) to access information and articles, but 
the subject of consent is often incomprehensible or misleading. Consumer choices are 
important to limit the amount of information they release in the online world on a daily basis, 
but they cannot be considered as the only ones responsible. For this reason, in this scenario 
legislation plays a crucial role in ensuring consumers a greater level of privacy protection. 
In modern economies, especially digital economies, companies collect a huge amount 
of data in relation to our characteristics. This information is then used to implement well-
planned strategies such as targeted advertising, price discrimination and personalized offers. 
In addition, there are companies (i.e. data-brokers) that enter the data market by favoring the 
collection, storage, organization, but also the sale of personal data, most of the time without 
the “data-subject”, i.e. the person to whom the data refer, being aware of it. 
How does the data-broker affect the strategies implemented by companies? How do 
data-broker strategies affect the outcome in terms of consumer surplus and total welfare? And 
in turn, how can the legislation intervene to limit potential anti-competitive behavior and 
favor greater social welfare?  
 In this paper we propose a model that encompasses the issue of economics of privacy 
with a focus on data-brokers and their strategic role in selling data to downstream firms, 
significantly influencing the equilibrium in terms of consumer surplus and total welfare. 
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The rise of large digital platforms and technologies has significantly facilitated the 
collection and the commercial use of personal data. At the same time, user bases have 
released unprecedented amounts of data concerning almost every facet about their lives, 
including preferences, habits, sexual and political orientation. Companies collect data about 
users from varieties of sources, both directly and indirectly, and this allows them to create 
detailed profiling of customers to which they offer personalized and targeted products and 
services. This has inevitably given rise to privacy concerns. Legislation has tried several 
times to offer individuals greater control over their personal data and to provide consumers 
with greater transparency on the way in which personal data is collected and used by 
companies enacting regulation such as the European General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).  
Through the “Economics of privacy”, economists have analyzed the trade-offs 
associated with the use and protection of consumer data, both at the individual (e.g. data 
breaches of data from a social profile of a person) and at the societal level (e.g. influencing 
political election results, as happened with the Cambridge Analytica scandal).  
In this paper we analyze a few critical issues in relation to the economics of privacy, 
dividing the discussion in three main chapters.  
 Chapter one covers the literature on the economics of privacy, revealing its distinctive 
features of complexity, interdisciplinarity and malleability, as well as its evolution over time. 
Moreover, we will analyze the consumer approach to privacy: how individuals make 
decisions related to privacy and how sometimes their decisions are counterintuitive. Choices 
of customers become relevant in the analysis of the trade-offs related to the interactions 
between consumers and companies collecting data to improve targeted strategies. 
The second chapter describes the main features of the data market that reflects the 
evolution brought by the digital transformation. However, the market of data remains almost 
obscure and unexplored. In this context, a strategic role is played by data-brokers, 
intermediaries collecting, storing and selling data to companies. The practices conducted by 
data-brokers have been the subject of an in-depth analysis by the Federal Trade Commission, 
which in 2014 published a report entitled "Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and 
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Accountability" to shed light on those companies, the amount of data they manage, and the 
lack of transparency characterizing their main activities.  
In the third chapter we develop a model characterized by an upstream data-broker 
selling its data to two downstream firms that compete on the retail market. Access to the data 
supplied by the data-broker allows firms to discriminate final users. We characterize 
downstream firms’ incentives to buy the data from the data-broker, and the optimal pricing 
strategy of this latter. The results of the model will be then translated into suggestions for the 
policy makers.  
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Chapter 1: Background 
 
 A lot of information is stored in the devices of users: people chat by using online 
applications, exchange messages and post pictures on social media, shop online, make 
research on browsers, and much more. These devices have made the life of humans simpler, 
but the same simple tasks users do with these devices help companies and organizations to 
create a very comprehensive picture about users themselves. The task done with these devices 
reveals information about financial data, location, pictures, ID, political interests, habits, the 
list of our contacts, health, and even more. Therefore, protecting the privacy of individuals 
has become a priority, especially in the information and digital age.  
What do we mean by privacy? What forms does privacy take? What does it mean to 
violate privacy?  
Privacy is a contested topic with a huge array of definitions. When talking about 
privacy, we must consider that the term “privacy” includes a multitude of meanings and areas 
of application, each with its own facets. Moreover, defining privacy also requires some 
abstract thinking. Generally speaking, privacy and the human rights associated with privacy 
can be seen as the imaginary barrier that prevents an individual from other people doing 
something harmful to him, and at the same time it allows a person to be open towards the 
people he trusts and to be close to those in the opposite case. This is why privacy can be seen 
as “the appropriate use of personal information under the circumstances. What is appropriate 
will depend on context, law, and the individual’s expectations”1. 
Privacy has been analyzed by different perspectives and disciplines, including 
economics, law, sociology, and political science (Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane, 
2015). Studies on privacy have concerned the autonomy, freedom, secrecy, anonymity and 
protection of personal data. As an example, in the past the issue of "privacy violation" was 
considered a type of violation with the potential to harm the dignity and integrity, but also the 




1International Association of Privacy Professionals, “IAPP Information Privacy Certification: Glossary 
of Common Privacy Terminology” 2011, privacyassociation.org. 
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1.1 Privacy concerns 
 
Our lives are constantly characterized by innovative products and services. The digital 
transformation and the Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) have 
dramatically changed the everyday life of people, from the way in which individuals interact 
between each other to the way in which business is done (Comino and Manenti, 2015).  
The pervasiveness of the internet has allowed users to access products and services 
sold by companies online: online firms, in fact, can operate in virtually unbounded markets, 
and in this way they can reach even distant customers. According to Statista2, in 2019 around 
85% of people living in developed countries used the Internet, a percentage that amounts to 
almost 45% for the individuals living in non-developing markets. Overall, the global online 
access rate was around 50%, a result that is showing an increasing trend over time. Moreover, 
the e-commerce industry continues to grow rapidly. Statista reported that online shopping is 
one of the most popular online activities worldwide: in 2019, retail e-commerce sales 
worldwide amounted to 3.53 trillion US dollars and e-retail revenues are projected to grow to 
6.54 trillion US dollars in 2022. 
Online users are always connected, and they can use any application or platform they 
want and need to reach different purposes. But this connectivity also brings side-effects: these 
online activities create an enormous amount of data.  
According to an estimate made by Visual Capital3, data created on the internet in 
2020 in one minute is terrific: 400,000+ hours or video stream by users, 2,500+ applications 
installed, around 7,000 packaged shipped, 200,000+ participants in meetings, 300+ new users 
and around 350,000+ stories uploaded on social media platforms, 500 hours of video 
uploaded by users, 50,000+ users connected, 40+ Ml messages shared. Despite the estimate, 
which includes the lockdown period caused by the pandemic, it is out of question the 
enormous amount of data shared by users and at the same time the amount of data collected 
by companies providing services. 
Companies collect data about customers and these data can be used for different 
purposes. For instance, data can be used to provide useful recommendations to customers: 
Amazon recommends products according to previous purchases; online streaming platforms 
 






such as Netflix or YouTube recommend video on the basis of the previously watched videos. 
However, data can also be used to track the online behavior of customers and to ultimately 
price discriminate. In 2000, customers discovered that Amazon was charging different prices 
for the same item, a DVD movie4: unexpectedly, the company was charging higher prices to 
regular customers and lower prices for non-regular customers. Amazon tried to explain that 
the company was trying to figure out how much their loyal customers would have paid: this 
was possible because Amazon was tracking the online behavior of customers and therefore 
their online purchase histories, a possibility of gathering information to which earlier 
companies did not have access to. Through an online forum, customers compared their 
purchase experience and therefore Amazon was ultimately forced to refund them. 
As early as 1998, Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian wrote in their book Information Rules: 
“[t]hose companies that are first, and best, at figuring out how to use the unique customer 
information available on the Web stand ready to reap substantial rewards” (p. 34). Thanks to 
the internet, online companies have information about their customers that they never had 
before, along with the technology to manage all the accumulated data: they have access to an 
enormous amount of data about user preferences, habits and characteristics. One of the recent 
events that has given rise to great concerns on the issue of privacy was the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal, which also involved Facebook. The 2018 Cambridge Analytica scandal 
has put under discussion the managing of data for billions of Facebook individuals. However, 
it has been an event with significant consequences on the concerns by people and users on 
how data is collected and managed not only by Facebook, but also by other big tech 
companies such as Apple, Google and Amazon and generally whoever company collects 
individual data.  
Companies collect and manage varieties of data: data of different volumes and 
qualities, but also data collected through different tools and devices. Once managed, analyzed 
and properly combined, these data can reveal additional or inferred information and it can 
also be used by sophisticated technologies to test predictive outcomes. This is called 
“metadata”, but Shoshana Zuboff, an Harvard professor, called it “behavioral surplus” in 
order to highlight the fact that additional information is extracted as a surplus of the reason by 
which initial data have been collected. Generally speaking, these terms indicates that data 
provides additional information which usually is generated through a proper use of 
technology. For example, knowing information such as phone numbers and IP addresses can 
 
4 The Washington Post, Streifeld, David, On the Web price tags blur: what you pay could depend on 
who you are, September 27, 2000 
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provide a starting point for compiling a picture of the online activities of users. Therefore, put 
together and sorted, data can reveal great added value. 
The idea that data, when collected and aggregated, has more value was also examined 
by Acquisti et al. (2014), who published a study about facial recognition. The authors asked 
students of the University of Carnegie Mellon to stop for a study in front of a laptop inside 
the University buildings in order to answer some questions from a survey while at the same 
time the authors were taking some pictures of the student. As long as each student was filling 
the questionnaire on the laptop, the picture taken was sent to a cloud where the authors had 
previously downloaded public images from the Facebook profile of students: in this way, 
through a facial recognition software, the authors tried to find a match between the student at 
that moment in front of the laptop and the photos of the same taken from the social network. 
In this study, authors were able to match around 33% of the students. Not satisfied, the 
authors tried to push the study forward: the authors were in fact able to conclude that in 
trying to match an anonymous face with a Facebook profile by using facial-recognition 
software, it can be easily found a name for that face and retrieved more sensible data. In the 
experiment, they were able to partially predict the SSN (Social Security Number), an identity 
code used in the US for having access, for instance, to a credit card or to a mortgage. The 
study by Acquisti et al (2014) was really interesting because once again it confirms the idea 
behind the “data accretion”: the fact that when you combine different databases, data 
increases, a concept somehow connected to that of “data linkability”. The conclusions were 
that a face is not something anonymous, but is something that can be connected to more 
personal and more sensible data of the individual: there can be much value that can be 
extracted from data, and sometimes this value can be extracted only if data can be aggregated 
and compared among a multitude of individuals. 
While it is true that almost all companies collect data, on the other hand it is also true 
that there are some particular companies that control a greater traffic of data and information. 
This applies for the so-called “Big Tech companies”, that are the largest and most dominant 
companies in the information technology industry, not only in the United States, but globally. 
According to Forbes, Google is tracking an online user on 86% of the top 50,000 websites of 
the planet5. Moreover, according to a research by the University of Oxford in the UK, 90.4% 
of apps share data with at least one third party, in which they conclude that 35.3% of the apps 
 
5 Forbes, “Google is tracking you on 86% of the Top 50,000 websites on the planet”, John Koetsier, 
March 11, 2020 
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share data with ten or more third parties6. Over the years, big tech companies have reached 
amazing market capitalization, creating higher barriers to entry and a very strong market 
power; moreover, they have been able to diversify their business into various profitable 
business niches, obtaining a widespread presence that allows them to collect varieties of data. 
These companies have a complete presence over different activities related to a day-to-day 
life of an individual. One example of a company having a presence in very different segments 
and sectors is Amazon. Besides of its e-commerce platform (Amazon.com), the company is 
present in other segments, such as: music (Amazon music), smart speaker (Amazon Alexa), 
audio-books (Audible), wallet and payments (Amazon Pay), logistic services (Amazon 
logistics), gaming streaming services (Twitch platform), cloud services (Aws), e-book 
(Amazon Kindle), film (IMDb), streaming services (Amazon Prime), and food (Whole 
Foods)7.  
The fact that few large companies have so many different applications and services 
around different activities (e.g. communications, chatting, web-browsing, searching, 
shopping, streaming, working, gaming) allow companies from one side to eliminate 
competition and stay competitive, while from the other side it allows “data linkability” of the 
digital life of online users, i.e. the possibility of cross-tracking online users across different 
activities, which ultimately constitutes a big issue to digital privacy. As an example, 
searching and browsing, if tracked, can reveal a lot about the inner thoughts and private 
moments or emotions and it can ultimately impact the health insurance fees of an individual. 
The fact that these companies are gaining significant market power and dominance, 
together with enormous amounts of data and information about individuals and users has 
raised some concerns not only among people but also from the antitrust authorities. For 
example, in 2020 Google has announced the acquisition of Fitbit, the fitness tracking 
company. The antitrust hearing decided to launch an investigation into the deal because 
Google, through this acquisition, was potentially gaining even more market power and 
“increasing the already vast amount of data that Google could use for personalization of the 
ads it serves and displays”8. However, in the end, the acquisition was confirmed and 
 
6Reuben Binns, UlrikLyngs, Max Van Kleek, Jun Zhao, Timothy Libert, and Nigel Shadbolt. 2018. 
Third Party Tracking in the Mobile Ecosystem. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Web 
Science (WebSci '18). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 23–31.  
7 https://www.amazon.jobs/it/business_categories/subsidiaries 
8CNBC, EU approves Google’s $2.1 billion acquisition of Fitbit, subject to conditions, December 17, 
2020 
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ultimately allowed, but the direction of the antitrust hearing in recent years has focused on 
investigating the real market dominance of these companies.  
Amazon leads the American largest online market, capturing approximately 70% of 
all sales in this market; Facebook continues to generate growing profits and users and appears 
not to have suffered the impact of sanctions and past privacy scandals; Google is the largest 
online search engine in the world, capturing over 90% of online searches; Apple has 
significant dominance in the app store9. These companies control key distribution channels, 
having access to user data as well as data from other companies. The enormous power and 
dominance consolidated by these companies over the years has become significant, therefore 
they have increased the concerns about their potential monopoly power they are leveraging 
on as well as the amount of the data they collect and treat.  
In July 2020, the CEOs of Facebook, Google, Amazon and Apple testified in front of 
the Congress in a tech antitrust hearing with the aim to examine their dominance10. The 
committee argued that companies like Facebook and Google control how information is 
disseminated, and the same is true for Apple and Amazon but in relation to, respectively, the 
app store and the marketplace. For years, these companies have been investigated for their 
acquisitions, predatory pricing and potential anti-competitive behavior.  
The Federal Trade Commission proclaims to act "protecting consumers and enhancing 
competition across broad sectors of the economy"11. As the United States, Europe is trying to 
limit big tech companies by imposing more transparency, trying to avoid monopoly positions 
and excessive powers, at the same time trying to create regulations that reflect the major 
changes taking place and the related repercussions from the point of view of consumers 
trying to protect their personal data and privacy. Another option that has been considered is to 
split Big Tech companies into smaller companies to limit their power, which instead could 
bring more value for investors, as was the case with Rockefeller which in 1911 was split into 
34 smaller companies after the decision of the Supreme Court12. 
Also the EU followed suits in trying to limit the power of these companies. In 
December 2020, the EU proposed new rules and regulations in order to limit the power of 
Big Tech companies, such as Amazon, Facebook, Google and Apple with greater fines in 
 
9 U.S. House Judiciary Committee, “Online Platforms and Market Power, Part 6: Examining the 
Dominance of Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google”, July 29, 2020, (judiciary.house.gov) 
10 The Economist, Alphabet, Amazon, Apple and Facebook face an antitrust grilling, July 28, 2020 
11 Federal Trade Commission, Privacy and Data Security Update: 2019 
12 The Economist, Dismembering Big Tech, October 24, 2019 
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case of disrespect and violation of these rules13. These rules go in parallel with the important 
and modern regulations emanated by the European Commission, i.e. the “Digital Markets 
Act” and the “Digital Service Act”: while the Digital Markets Act is aimed at “ensuring fair 
and open digital markets”, the Digital Markets Act is aimed at “ensuring a safe and 
accountable online environment”. The Digital Markets Act14 proposes new rules that favor 
growth and a higher level of competitiveness, thus favoring the entry of smaller companies. 
Furthermore, the rules are aimed at putting the individual user at the center, protecting their 
online rights and establishing greater transparency in the interaction between the user and the 
company. 
Another important issue is the presence of a data market and the related data-brokers. 
The fact that data, in addition to being collected, is also exchanged and marketed has given 
rise to great perplexities and has required intervention by the legislation. The subject of 
legislation does not only concern the protection of the individual, defined as the "data-
subject", but also the trade in data and the competition or competitive advantage that a 
company can enjoy through the data at its disposal. 
Given the great concerns, however, the responsibility should not lie entirely with the 
individual. Companies and businesses are asked to keep customer data safe, either because it 
is imposed by the law or because they want to build trust. Data collected by companies (e.g. 
location, online and offline monitoring, personal data) are of enormous importance to them 
and help companies to develop more efficient products and services, as well as advertising 
and marketing campaigns and the possibility of implementing discrimination practices. While 
customer data provides opportunities for companies to achieve better results and increase 
profits through personalized offers for customers, on the other hand, in order to access this 
data correctly, organizations must establish rules and actions of trust and transparency 
regarding what such data will be used for and with whom it will be shared15.  
In 1967, Alan Westin wrote a book called “Privacy and Freedom” in which he defined 
privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups or institutions to determine for themselves when, 
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”16. By the 1990s, 
almost all countries followed suit. An example of this is that the Supreme Court embraced 
 




15 KPMG (2018), GDPR, data privacy and the consumer 
16 Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 1967), p.7 
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this view and in 1989 the Department of Justice stated that “privacy encompass[es] the 
individual's control of information concerning his or her person"17. This was not an US 
phenomenon and in fact Europe, Asia, and other countries have tried to adapt their rules and 
legislations. Europe, for instance, enacted the General Data Protection Regulation or GDPR 
(2016), which "strengthens data protection safeguards, provides additional and stronger rights 
to individuals, increases transparency, and makes all those that handle personal data more 
accountable and responsible"18, or more recently California with the California Consumer 
Privacy Act (2018). These legislations were created with the aim of informing users on how 
their data are collected and treated, as well as providing them more control over the 
information released online. 
 After all, privacy is intrinsically linked to the individual, and the growing loss of 
control over personal information as well as the need for greater transparency with regard to 
data collection, data storage and data processing has made it necessary the intervention of 
legislation and regulators. Since it came into effect, the GDPR has attracted a lot of attention 
around the world and therefore there has been discussion about the possibility of obtaining a 
"global privacy consent". The evolving process regarding regulations about data privacy is 
continuing and it is bringing new proposals and regulations. For instance, another proposed 
extension of the GDPR is the “ePrivacy regulation”19 (Directive on Privacy and Electronic 
communications) and the Digital Services Act which, but new regulations are emerging in 
countries such as South Africa, India, Singapore, everyone with its adaptations. In the end, 
the path being pursued is that of a common agreement on the importance of issues related to 
privacy, not only at a European level but also and above all at a global level.  
1.2 Economic theories about privacy and the three waves 
 
Economists have tried to analyze privacy from different points of view, considering 
that an agent aims to maximize its utility, but privacy can positively or negatively affect this 
utility, as well as it can also affect transactions and equilibria regarding data disclosure. The 
economics of privacy regards the “economic value and consequences of protecting and 
 
17 US Supreme Court, JUSTIA, Department Of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 
489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) (https://www.justice.gov/archive/oip/foia_guide09/exemption6.pdf) 
18 European Commission, Commission report: EU data protection rules empower citizens and are fit 
for the digital age, June 24,2020 
19 European Data Protection Board, Statement on the ePrivacy Regulation and the future role of 
Supervisory Authorities and the EDPB, adopted on 19 November 2020 
13 
disclosing personal information” and “the trade-offs associated with the balancing of public 
and private spheres between individuals, organizations, and governments” (Acquisti et al., 
2016). 
Economics of privacy is not a recent field. Actually, we refer to privacy as something 
that has evolved over time and as something that has been attributed to different meanings 
and definitions according to the period of reference.  
While the first works on privacy were mainly focused on the topic of “privacy of 
information”, which is a fraction of economics of privacy, subsequently, the study of privacy 
turned to the collection, processing and use of personal information, as well as the disclosure 
of data and information by individuals themselves. From this perspective, the economic 
studies concerning privacy have focused on the so-called "informational privacy", i.e. the 
"personal information and the problems and opportunities created by its collection, its 
processing, its dissemination, and its invasion" (Brandimarte and Acquisti, 2012). Another 
perspective describes privacy as “the policies, procedures, and other controls that determine 
which personal information is collected, how it is used, with whom it is shared, and how 
individuals who are the subject of that information are informed and involved in this 
process”20. At the center of this vision there is the individual, since the information revealed 
about a person is intrinsically a specific trait of the person. In the past two decades (2000-
2020) the explosion of research on economics of privacy has significantly enlarged the 
boundaries of the study about privacy by economists.  
The evolution of the concept of privacy should be related to the period of reference: 
as time changes, the concept of privacy has evolved accordingly. Acquisti et al (2016) 
analyze this evolution talking about three main “waves”: 
- First wave (early 1980s) 
- Second wave (mid 1990s) 




20 Lauren Steinfeld and Kathleen Sutherland Archuleta, “Privacy Protection and Compliance in Higher 
Education: The Role of the CPO,” Educause Review, vol. 41, no. 5 (September/October 2006), pp. 
62–71 
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1.2.1 The first wave 
 
Economics of privacy dates back to the early 1970s and 1980s (i.e. “first wave” 
period), as an issue treated by important economists in the field of economics and law, such 
as Richard Posner and George Stigler, who were part of the Chicago School of Economics, a 
school mainly known for its laissez-faire approach and the strong belief that when markets 
are left mostly to their own devices, they perform best. 
In his articles of 1978 and 1981, Richard Posner touched on many interesting points. 
First of all, Posner admitted that there could be many different dimensions of privacy, 
confirming that privacy is a malleable concept. Among the things written by Posner, a 
relevant definition was that of privacy as a “concealment of information”, and this idea was 
followed for a long time by economists. Moreover, Posner distinguished between “good 
information” and “bad information” (e.g. negative traits): according to this distinction, Posner 
stated that while individuals with positive traits have interests in showing them, people tend 
to hide bad information about themselves. For instance, an employee that is deficient in some 
characteristics has an incentive to conceal those deficiencies. Basically, the idea is that if an 
individual has “bad information”, this can be a good reason why he may want to have his 
privacy protected. 
Another important conclusion made by Posner in his work was that, by reducing 
information available to “buyers” in the market (e.g. in the example above, the employers), 
the efficiency of the market is reduced. According to this view, the “cost of privacy” or 
“concealment cost” is not incurred by the privacy subject, but by other people who cannot 
access that information. For instance, if an employer is not allowed to do drug-testing on 
employees, an employer may end-up having some deficient employees (e.g. drug-addicted 
employees): in the end, the buyer is “paying the price” for the privacy of the employee. 
Posner extended the argument also to non-market economic behavior. As an example, talking 
about the marriage, Posner said that there is an incentive to hide information before the 
marriage, because individuals tend to highlight their positive traits and at the same time hide 
their negative traits: once again, the cost of concealment is incurred by who receives 
misleading information (in this case the partner). Finally, Posner believes that privacy is re-
distributive: privacy creates a reallocation of the costs from one party to another and this 
reduces efficiency. 
15 
According to Posner, privacy is depicted as something negative, since it can be seen 
as something that reduces market efficiency and therefore a possible solution to limit the 
negative effects of privacy is the usage of no regulations at all. 
Following the idea proposed by Posner, George Stigler (1980), another member of the 
Chicago School of Economics, suggests that, independently of whether there is regulation 
that creates a right of privacy or not, just by following the economic incentives the exchange 
of information will lead to desirable economics outcomes independently of the ownership of 
data. For instance, consider the difference between a “good debtor” and a “bad debtor”. For a 
good debtor, one that pays his debt in full, it is useful that the information about its reliability 
is well known, and therefore it seems reasonable for him to have a system that tracks the 
credit history of the debtor and to share his track-record with as many entities and credit 
institutions as possible. On the other hand, a bad debtor will push for having privacy on its 
credit history, but at the same time, by hiding this information, the debtor will end up paying 
higher rates on the debt. If people expect that good debtor shares information about his credit 
history and bad debtor hides these information, whenever an individual that hides information 
is encountered, it can immediately conclude that the individual is a bad debtor and therefore, 
regardless of whether there are or not information about the credit history of the individual, 
the same individual will end up paying higher rates on the debt.   
Stigler (1980) proposed that data should not be owned by the person that owns the 
data, but by the person or the entity that incurs the cost of acquiring the information (i.e. the 
entity has the right over data). For instance, if Visa is building a large database and a big 
infrastructure to capture information about credit card transactions of an individual, that 
information belongs to Visa from a legal point of view and it is not owned by the individual. 
At the time, the idea proposed by Stigler was forward-looking, in the sense that his view was 
in contrast with the common legal view of the time, which instead was suggesting that the 
data-subject should own the data.  
The issue related to the “data subject” and the idea that the subject is the owner of the 
data has been debated a lot, also in more recent times. In 2020, in the US some candidates of 
the Democratic party have proposed the idea of “data dividends”, i.e. the concept that people 
should earn dividends and payments for the data that digital platforms (e.g. social media 
platforms) used about themselves21.  
 
 
21 Source: https://www.datadividendproject.com 
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1.2.2 The second wave 
 
After the “first wave”, characterized by a period of growth in the topics related to 
economics of privacy, there was a relatively flat period on the issue regarding privacy and 
economics. In the 1990s, a new generation of economists, including Eli Noam, Kenneth C. 
Laudon and Hal Varian, started reconsidering economics of privacy and more specifically 
“privacy of data” in the light of the Information Technology (IT) revolution, defined as the 
“second wave”. 
Hal Varian (1996), among his books and articles, published a little paper about the 
economic aspects of personal data, in which he touched some important issues regarding 
personal data. First of all, he pointed out that positive or negative externalities are really what 
creates problems in terms of privacy management from an economic standpoint. For instance, 
a consumer can rationally decide to share or not some information with a company, but once 
data is shared with a company there can be many potential secondary uses of this data that the 
customer may not anticipate but for which he supports the consequences. These additional 
uses could create externalities, so some other trade-offs, both positive and negative, which 
end up affecting the consumer but over which the consumer has little or no control. For 
example, Amazon could generate positive externalities for the consumer by improving the 
recommendations for him, but at the same time the company can use these data and sell them 
to other companies and these other companies can ultimately use it in an harmful way, for 
instance they can be used for price discrimination practices against the customer.  
In addition, Varian suggested that, during the 1990s, privacy was becoming a 
contested topic mainly because of the process of the digitization of information, which has 
collapsed the marginal cost of data collection and data storage. This has facilitated the access 
to resources technically difficult to access for the public, making them accessible with very 
low costs. Therefore, when the cost of collection, storage and of accessing information 
collapses, more and more people will be willing and able to access information, and this 
creates new privacy problems. The proposal of Varian was to assign property rights to private 
information in order to allow consumers to take control of how information about them is 
used, and for example making it costly for companies and organizations to access certain 
digital information. 
Eli Noam (1997) suggested that in absence of transaction costs in trading data, initial 
assignment of privacy rights is arbitrary from the standpoint of economic efficiency, an idea 
that recall the theorem of Ronald Coase (1960). Eli Noam applied the idea of Coase to 
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privacy: the idea of Noam was that what really matters in terms of privacy outcome in the 
marketplace are the valuations of the data made by different entities. For example, if a 
consumer values its privacy more than what Amazon values the access and usage of 
consumer data, the consumer will be willing to pay Amazon an extra premium in order to get 
its privacy protected. Whereas if, on the contrary, Amazon is more interested in the data of 
the consumers than what the consumer value its privacy, the valuation by Amazon of the data 
of consumers is higher than the valuation about privacy by the consumer, and therefore even 
if there is a regulation that in theory protects the data by customer, Amazon will offer the 
consumer extra money (or a discount on the products) to get access to customer data. From 
this perspective, Eli Noam concludes that the use of data protection systems (i.e. 
cryptography) has no effect on the output of a transaction and on what ultimately remains to 
the party that has control over the data, but rather on the mere value exchanged between the 
two agents involved in the transaction. Essentially, the system of encryption does not end-up 
determining the final outcome of the system from an economic point of view, but it impacts 
on the issue related to “who has to pay whom?”. Once again, if there is a regulation 
protecting data by a customer and Amazon really wants to, the company itself will have to 
pay the customer (i.e. the owner of the data), and so there is a redistribution of wealth from 
the service provider to the data subject. If there is no regulation, but the consumer really 
wants to protect its privacy, then in this case the customer will pay Amazon, so there is a 
redistribution of wealth from a privacy-conscious consumer to the organization. Therefore, 
the outcome is not affected inherently by the law, but it is affected by the economic 
incentives of the agents. However, the theoretical thinking of Noam revealed some problems 
from a practical perspective, because there are a lot of difficulties in constructing a system or 
a contract which allows consumers to freely trade ownership of their data. 
Kenneth C. Laudon (1997), following somewhat the idea proposed by Hal Varian, 
tried to propose an information market in which the individual could exchange and transfer 
the rights to their personal data in exchange for a monetary counterpart. More precisely, the 
aim of his ideas was to “allow personal information to be bought and sold, conferring on the 
seller the right to determine how much information is divulged” (1996). 
 During this period, the interest among economists was on the economics of 
information. In 1998, Hal Varian and Carl Shapiro wrote a book called “Information Rules” 
about how to apply economics analysis to information markets and information goods. The 
point was that when we analyze information using economics we are analyzing specific 
goods and services that we call “information goods”. For instance, a book can be considered 
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as an information good, because most people buy a book because they want the information 
contained therein. The same is true when a person buys a course or streams a video from the 
internet: it is not the physical experience of sitting and watching, but it is the information 
contained that matters the most. Under this perspective, there are a lot of goods and services 
that embody information and which are bought and sold on the market, but information itself 
is not an economic good: a person does not buy information, but books, lectures, consulting 
services and so on. 
 
1.2.3 The third wave 
 
The second wave set the foundation for an explosion of the research in the field of 
privacy economics that has taken place starting from the early 2000s, which we refer to as the 
“third wave”. The third wave has been characterized by a huge interest in the economics of 
privacy, and in fact, for the two decades 2000-2020 it can be found an enormous amount of 
empirical and theoretical research of privacy economics. After the 2000s, because of the 
commercial expansions of the Internet and of the World Wide Web, there was a parallel 
expansion of the field of economics of privacy among its fragmentations, and in this way 
economics of privacy started to have more and more sub-fields. During this period, different 
things happened simultaneously: 
1. An increased modeling sophistication: increasingly sophisticated theoretical game 
models and industrial organization models; 
2. A diversification of focus of researchers and academics; 
3. The emergence of empirical analyses: data to study in order to understand how 
customers value personal information, how companies value data, and so on; 
4. The emergence of applied behavioral economic research, used as an attempt to study 
privacy decision making; 
5. A parallel emergence of the economics of information security. The term 
“information privacy” itself refers to data privacy and data protection. This idea 
comes from the more recent relationship between data and technology: the need for 
protecting privacy is intrinsically related to technology and with the usage of 
technological devices. In the early 2000s, Ross Anderson wrote a paper called “Why 
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is information security hard?” (2001)22, in which he blended information technology 
and cryptography and that led to the formation of a work on social and information 
security which since then has become very strong and more developed. 
Graphically, the representation of the three waves can be depicted as: 
 
 
Figure 1: Alessandro Acquisti: Privacy, Policy and Regulation(2019)  
Atlanta Fed Financial Markets Conference 
 
Following the distinction proposed by Acquisti et at (2016), the revision of the so-called 
"three waves" still confirms that the economy of privacy is a vast, complex, and malleable 
concept. The issue of privacy has been analyzed through different perspectives and fields of 
application; however, each of these has established the need to protect what is, after all, a 
fundamental human right. The problems that emerge from the violation of privacy, or in 
 
22Anderson, R. “Why Information Security Is Hard - an Economic Perspective.” Seventeenth Annual 
Computer Security Applications Conference, IEEE, 2001, pp. 358–65 
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general from the loss of this right, put the individual at serious risk. That said, legislation has 
also sought to protect individuals given the rise of numerous trade-offs associated with 
privacy 
 
1.3 The consumer approach to privacy 
 
  In March 2020, Siân Brooke and Carissa Véliz, two professors from Oxford 
University, published the results of a questionnaire conducted online, concerning individuals 
with different nationalities and focused on issues related to privacy23. An important finding 
was that 92% of respondents had a negative experience related to privacy, whether it was 
identity theft, public humiliation, or even being a target of spyware. 
What do people think about their privacy? Do they really care about protecting their 
personal data and information? To what extent are they willing to receive personalized offers 
in exchange for the disclosure of their data? 
People react in different ways to privacy: some of them are really concerned about the 
current situation, while some others are not so worried about it. Human behavior towards the 
protection of personal data has been studied on one of the many branches of the privacy 
economy, called more precisely "behavioral economics of privacy".  
There can be many issues in relation to how individuals take decisions regarding their 
personal data. A first problem concerns information asymmetry, i.e. the fact that individuals 
often do not know or cannot know what is happening to their personal data, due to a lack of 
transparency. A second problem, related in some way to the previous one, is bounded 
rationality: even if individuals were given as much information as possible about what 
happens to their online data, that information would be overwhelming. The analysis of these 
first two problems reveals a possible explanation: very often it is difficult to reach an optimal 
result in terms of privacy, not because of individuals, but because the ramifications and 
complexities of data sharing are not easy to detect and understand fully. A third problem is 
related to behavioral and cognitive biases: the decision-making process of individuals with 
regard to their data can differ from theoretical models of rationality commonly used in 
economics. For instance, in a series of experiments, Brandimarte et al (2013) found that 
giving people more control over their personal data can paradoxically make them more 
willing to take risks over their personal data by disclosing more information than what is 
 
23  Brooke, Siân&Véliz, Carissa (2020). Views on Privacy. A Survey. In Data, Privacy, and the 
Individual. PhilArchive copy v1: https://philarchive.org/archive/BROVOP-3v1 
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needed to strangers. This conclusion does not reveal the uselessness of personal data 
protection policies, but it highlights that the way in which consumers are given the possibility 
to control their personal data, which is related to the drafting of privacy policies, can 
influence and alter consumer decisions, exposing them to greater risks. 
In the modern and digital economy, an important trade-off is between what customers 
offer about themselves (i.e. personal information and data) and what they get in exchange 
(e.g. recommendations and personalized offers). While people are willing to share personal 
information in exchange for tangible benefits or enhanced products or services, the disclosing 
of personal information and the way in which companies collect and use data is for them a 
real concern. However, the fact that these benefits are obtained in exchange for the disclosure 
of personal information has raised concerns about the net benefits. For instance, Alan Westin, 
which has significantly contributed to the research on privacy, in his 2008 survey concluded 
that “offering online users free email or free searches did not seem to a majority of our 
respondents to be a sufficient set of benefits or valued services to overcome the instinctive 
feeling of not wanting to be tracked and marketed to based on their online transactions and 
surfs” (Alan Westin, 2008). 
Customers can be more or less aware of the opportunities and threats deriving from an 
economy based on data. There can be some efficiency gains from the willingness to share 
certain kinds of information by people. For instance, by revealing certain information they 
can more potentially find a beneficial match: the matching process works better when the 
algorithm has specific details about individuals. This happens, for example, with the 
recommendations of Amazon when an individual is shopping online, or even when he uses 
applications for dating. On the contrary, this helps companies to improve the personalization 
of their product and services, and facilitate innovation. However, revealing information can 
also have side effects: as an example, users can be the object of target advertising or price 
discrimination strategies. Sometimes, when revealing data, some customers can even adapt 
their behavior according to the information disclosed, in this way starting to regulate and to 
pay more attention to their actions (i.e. Hawthorne effect).  
Said that, can customers fully protect themselves if they want to? Or, putting it in 
other terms, are there really market failures related to privacy? Among the multitudes of ways 
in which the term “market failure” can be used, in this context it is referred to the case in 
which there is a demand for a good and the market actually is not providing the proper supply 
for that good. If we analyze the issue from the perspective of demand and supply for privacy, 
it can be said that there is a real supply for privacy because there are some companies that 
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adopt privacy protection instances or that offer customers privacy technologies (e.g. Tor, ad-
blockers services, etc). 
In 2016 the Pew Research Center24 conducted a study in the United States in which 
they found that around 91% of participants agreed that they had lost control of their personal 
and private information. Moreover, 86% of respondents said they have taken action to 
increase their level of online privacy protection, but much can still be done. A survey of 
McKinsey (2020) revealed that even if online users are aware of the online risks and practices 




Source: Adapted from Pew Research Center (2019) 
 
This graph, retrieved from the survey of the Pew Research Center (2019) shows the 
percentage of respondents who feel little or no control over the information collected by 
companies or the US Government. Overall, this graph shows that individuals suffer from 
different kinds of concerns regarding their data and the associated loss of privacy. More than 
80% of respondents felt the lack of control over the information collected by companies and 
governments for data regarding varieties of details: physical location, activities on social 
media, private conversations, history of online and offline purchases, websites visited and 
searches done online. In addition, the lack of privacy and control over data is perceived as 
 
24 Pew Research Center, 2016, The state of privacy in post-Snowden America 
25 McKinsey & Company, The consumer-data opportunity and the privacy imperative, April 27, 2020 
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risky, associated with privacy concerns and lack of transparency on how data collected are 
then used by both companies and the government. 
There are products and services that are used to embody information or to facilitate 
the enhancement of privacy. Therefore, like any other good or service, there is a market for 
privacy goods services, and the goods and services for protecting privacy vary according to 
the degree of privacy protection a person is looking for. Moreover, the market provides 
information and communication goods and services with different features, one of them being 
privacy: when looking for a product or service, a customer takes into consideration its various 
attributes, also in relation with its alternatives, such as the quality, the ease of use, the added 
value that a product or service brings, and so forth, but also the level of privacy protection as 
one of these attributes. People are choosing among different privacy goods and services they 
consume, and each of them provide different levels of privacy, and the willingness to 
consume them depends on the overall benefits and costs of those, relative to other goods and 
services that provide other features with more or less privacy protection. 
In the market, companies offer goods and services that include a bundle of features, 
some of which relates to privacy, while some others do not. In a digital world, there can be 
many options an individual can take: encrypted or regular emails (2018 data reveals $123M 
extracted from Facebook and Google, McKinsey), chats, voice calls and video calls, browsers 
that block cookies or not, social media or search engines that store information or not, ad-
blocking software (McKinsey stated that ad-blockers are used globally by more than 600 
million devices) and incognito browsers (40% of internet users globally, McKinsey)26. For 
instance, a person can decide to use Telegram or Signal, instead of regular text messaging, or 
to use Tor or other peer-to-peer encryption systems like DuckDuckGo instead of Google in 
order to get a higher degree of privacy protection. McKinsey has reported a survey in which 
14% of internet users adopt encrypted communication systems and only ⅓ of them change 
their online passwords on a regular basis27.  
While some people use alternative solutions and give up certain features in exchange 
for a higher level of privacy, not everybody is willing to make this cut, even if conscious that 
using certain tools leads individuals to be more subject to be traced or to a lower level of 
privacy protection. Let us consider DuckDuckGo, which offers a privacy-focus search 
engine, an alternative to Google: while Google dominates the search engine market (85%), 
DuckDuckGo has only the 1% of the market, despite having registered a significant past 
 
26 McKinsey, The consumer-data opportunity and the privacy imperative, April 27, 2020 
27 McKinsey & Company, The consumer-data opportunity and the privacy imperative, April 27, 2020 
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growth either in the market share and in its profits (The New York Times, 2019). Like 
Google and any other search engine, DuckDuckGo shows ads on the top of its search results, 
with the difference that it does not track the online behavior of users and therefore it does not 
show target and personalized ads. Despite the company offering an easy-to-use interface, 
users believe that by using it, they would obtain lower quality results despite the higher level 
of privacy protection. This example actually shows how people do not seem willing to “give 
up much to recover their privacy, and are easily overwhelmed when they decide to try to 
make a change”28. If people value privacy over other attributes, such as the quality of the 
search results, then we would expect a wider usage of services providing a deeper level of 
privacy protection such as DuckDuckGo, but actually only a small portion of the online users 
adopt it. 
Even if it is not possible to entirely protect privacy in the online world, there are some 
countermeasures available for every online user. However, when dealing with privacy and 
privacy issues, there is a significant trade-off between stated preferences and revealed 
preferences: while on one side people feel like they are losing control over their personal data 
and information, on the other side they are not actually willing to use alternative tools, 
services and countermeasures that allow them to reach an higher level of privacy protection.  
Generally speaking, there have been different proposals regarding tools that increase 
privacy protection, such as tools with more transparent privacy policies and applications 
increasing the level of default encryption. There are a lot of opportunities for consumers to 
reach a higher level of privacy or to choose bundled services that include levels of privacy at 
the expense of some other attributes, but stated preferences do not always correspond to 
revealed preferences. Despite people claiming to care about privacy, several times they end 
up making choices that are inconsistent with their stated preferences (Athey et al. 2017). This 
dichotomy is expressed by the “privacy paradox”: when dealing with privacy, choices of 
customers can be in contrast with their actual behavior when they are incentivized to do so, 
e.g. when using a free or supposedly free product or service.  
In the context of the behavioral economics of privacy, Brandimarte, Acquisti and 
Loewenstein (2013) study how people make privacy-related decisions about the protection of 
their data and how these decisions can sometimes be influenced by factors that in theory 
should not matter too much, such as the way in which requests are presented to them. The 
authors carried out a study on the control of personal data (i.e. "control over information 
 
28The New York Times, A Feisty Google Adversary Tests How Much People Care About Privacy, 15 
July, 2019 
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flows") trying to understand if, by giving people more control over their data, they feel more 
protected and paradoxically begin to take more risks, revealing more information about 
themselves. The authors conducted a random experiment involving two groups. A first group 
of people was shown a questionnaire with less invasive questions (e.g. sentimental situation) 
and others more invasive (e.g. use of drugs or sexual activity): the questionnaire provided for 
voluntary disclosure by respondents, meaning they could decide whether to answer a question 
or not, knowing that only the answers would have been taken into consideration. A second 
group of participants in the experiment was given a very similar questionnaire, but with one 
significant difference aimed at giving respondents more control over their information: an 
addition of a column in which, for each question, the candidate authorized or not the use of 
that particular answer. Paradoxically, the authors demonstrate that by making people feel 
more in control of their privacy, it makes them more willing to disclose personal information: 
in the second group, where people in addition to responding gave consent to use of 
information, the estimated response rate to the most intrusive questions was double that of the 
first group. 
In conclusion, the privacy paradox reveals the issue behind the decisions affecting 
privacy made by users, a thing that can be taken into consideration when new regulations are 
drafted, avoiding regulations that “inadvertently lead consumers to be faced with additional 
effort or a less smooth experience in order to make a privacy-protective choice" (Athey et al., 
2017). 
Another thing to mention regards privacy policies terms and conditions, widely used 
by companies and online service providers to regulate the usage of personal data they collect, 
also thanks to regulations such as the European GDPR (2016) and other international 
proposals. These are very important documents in which users have the possibility to be 
aware of how their personal data are collected and treated. The problem is that not every 
person reads carefully these terms and conditions and this can be related to many factors 
(Steinfeld, 2016): e.g. the possibility to easily forego reading these documents, the length of 
the document, or the fact that people are more interested in only some paragraphs and not on 
the entire document29.  
Pew Research Center (2019) shows that about one-in-five Americans always or often 
reads privacy policies before agreeing to them, and moreover, only a minority of those who 
 
29Nili Steinfeld, “I agree to the terms and conditions: (How) do users read privacy policies online? An 
eye-tracking experiment”, Computers in Human Behavior, Volume 55, Part B, 2016, Pages 992-1000 
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read these terms and conditions say they read them all the way through30. In addition, the 
study by Pew Research refers that most Americans aim for stronger and stricter government 
rules and regulations about what companies can do with individual data, as well as they think 
they need, in almost equal terms, either better tools for allowing people to control their 
personal data by themselves or stronger laws governing companies.  
The consent that people give to privacy policies is of particular interest, especially for 
few important aspects: 
- Length and complexity of privacy policies consent, two factors that at the extreme 
make the privacy policy inaccessible or difficult to read; 
- The way in which privacy policies are presented is somehow not useful at all. For 
instance, sometimes a user must forcibly give his consent in order to access a specific 
website. 
- “Responsibilization”: legal consent should not shift data responsibility to the user 
giving consent, instead it should give equal responsibilities and equal rights to both 
parties, with a focus on consumer data and privacy protection. Otherwise, the act of 
giving consent would have strong legal significance and implications mainly for the 
user. 
In addition, some policies have constantly been changed over the past year: for 
example, it has been analyzed that the privacy policies of Google evolved from a two-minute 
read in 1999 to a peak of 30 minutes in 2018. For this purpose, regulations and legislations 
have intervened over these policies in order to push for a “concise, transparent and 
intelligible form, using clear and plain language”31. Despite the effort made by regulators and 
legislations to make them more accessible, privacy policies still remain full of legal jargon 
and opaquely explain how companies collect and manage data of individuals. 
The problem is that when an individual gives consent to the processing of personal 
data without understanding how their data will be processed, which often happens when a 
user wants to quickly access digital content. To this regard, Jonathan David Leibowitz, who 
also served as the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which represents the 
United States largest privacy regulator, said: “Initially, privacy policies seemed like a good 
 
30 Pew Research Center, 2019, Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of 
Control Over Their Personal Information, November 15, 2019 
31 The New York Times, Opinion | We Read 150 Privacy Policies. They Were an Incomprehensible Disaster 
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idea. But in practice, they often leave a lot to be desired. In many cases, consumers don’t 
notice, read, or understand the privacy policies. They are often posted inconspicuously via a 
link at the very bottom of the site’s homepage – and filled with fine-print legalese and 
technotalk”32.  
Privacy policy dictated by the United States and the OECD have focused on the idea 
that "with enough transparency and enough choice consumers would make better privacy 
decisions" (Athey et al., 2017). With the introduction of the Privacy Act of 1974 and the rules 
contained therein, "notice and choice" methods were used to safeguard privacy: first there is a 
notice, whose task is to provide users with information regarding the collection and use of 
personal information, then, on the basis of the information made available to them, users 
make a choice, deciding whether to agree or not to policies. Based on this notice and choice 
system and when incentivized to do so, Athey et al. (2017) demonstrate that users can be 
conditioned on whether or not to share their data and may even choose technologies that offer 
less privacy protection. Therefore, in the same way, privacy methodologies based on the 
notice and consent approach may not be efficient in their role of protecting digital users: the 
consent given by the user may not be the mirror of a true intention. It is therefore a certain 
complexity that consumer choice should be given to governments, companies and 
organizations that should keep their personal data safe. 
Another important thing that influences the decision of users about privacy is what in 
the industrial organization field is called “network effect”. Networks, especially in the online 
world, can become of bigger size also thanks to the so-called “data network effect”33, i.e. the 
value of a product or service increases the more data goes into the system. The underlying 
idea is that, ultimately, all the users of the product or service benefit: the more users join the 
network, the more data they release from their usage of the product or service. Data put into 
the system is used to improve the value which is given back to users (very often through 
algorithms) and this additional value should end-up attracting even more users. That is a 
virtuous cycle that can significantly give companies a significant competitive advantage and 
for them this works better when everything is automated: the way in which it captures data, 
the way in which the product or service gets more valuable (especially if the system is 
capable of collecting data in real-time) and the way in which the product or service is 
provided to customers. 
 
32 Federal Trade Commission, So private, so public: individuals, the Internet & the paradox of 
behavioral marketing, Remarks of Commissioner Jon Leibowitz at the FTC Town Hall Meeting on 
“Behavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting & Technology” November 1, 2007  
33 The Economist, Data is giving rise to a new economy, May 6, 2017  
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Consider Waze, the application that provides information on road traffic thanks to the 
real-time contribution of the network of drivers: the more users join the network and the 
better it is for each one of them. Waze needs a minimum amount of information disclosed by 
customers to function properly, but it also collects data from the network and transmits it to 
the different users in real time. Therefore, the core value of the application is based mainly on 
the data collected and then transmitted to users, and users themselves can perceive the value 
created by data, either from those they introduce, but also from those that they receive back 
from the application, independently from the data introduced. This example shows how 
people can sometimes be incentivized and willing to introduce their information (e.g. name, 
location, etc) to benefit from a service that potentially gives them back useful information. 
Individuals may be willing to join a network for many different reasons, either 
because companies are offering particularly good products or services, or because they want 
to join and feel part of a network or, in general, because they perceive value from being part 
of the network itself. The benefit of the individual also lies in the diffusion and pervasiveness 
that a particular product or service has reached. The network effect has been particularly 
important for platforms such as Facebook and WhatsApp, which over time have managed to 
have a significant user base, but when privacy issues affecting one of these platforms arise, 





34 Bloomberg, Why WhatsApp’s New Privacy Rules Are Sparking Alarm, January 11, 2021 
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Telegram and Signal have been two applications that, differently from Messenger and 
WhatsApp, have been used mainly by users willing to obtain a much higher level of privacy 
protection. As the above graph shows35, with the proposal at the beginning of 2021 to merge 
WhatsApp data with the rest of the advertising operations of its parent company Facebook, 
the number of daily downloads of Telegram and Signal have skyrocketed. This might suggest 
that people have decided to embrace the use of applications that offer them a greater level of 
privacy protection, but the adoption of Telegram and Signal did not coincide with a decline in 
the use of Messenger and WhatsApp. Therefore, this demonstrated the strength of the 
network effect and the fact that still a large number of users were not so worried about 
privacy concerns. 
1.4 Privacy trade-offs 
 
Everything done online releases some data about individuals. The American Civil 
Liberties Union reports that information derived from cell phone directories, e-mail 
information and Internet purchases can "paint a profoundly detailed picture of our lives"36. 
The profiling of each individual can be used, for example, for target advertising purposes and 
in some cases the user itself can benefit from some suggested products, but the phenomenon 
should be analyzed as a whole because the user itself can end up supporting the major risks. 
Moreover, the combination of different pieces of information can reveal a lot about the 
profile of a person (i.e. “data-linkability”).  
When browsing online, or when using an application or a social network, people 
should be responsible and accurately decide what to share and what not, because once the 
content is shared, the platform gains a certain control over that information. The underlying 
idea is that social media are regulated by specific rules and norms. But, if we think about it, 
social media platforms and applications have gone beyond the scope of keeping people in 
contact with each other: they have become an integral part of our lives and the functions 
implemented over time allow users to do even more things.  
Tucker (2014) analyzes privacy in relation to platforms, social networks and websites 
that typically receive significant revenue from advertising, which in turn is targeted based on 
user characteristics. During the conduct of his experiment, Tucker discovered that the social 
 
35Fortune, Signal and Telegram downloads surge, passing Facebook chat tools, February 2, 2021 
36 Metadata and Privacy A Technical and Legal Overview (2014) 
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network (i.e. Facebook) changed some parameters regarding privacy, which allowed 
usersgreater protection over their personal data and greater control over the data exchanged 
with third parties. However, despite the change, advertisers could still use the same personal 
data available to them to personalize advertisements. More precisely, after the privacy policy 
change, users were almost twice as likely to react positively to personalized ad content and 
click on personalized ads, while no significant change was found in non-personalized ads. 
Despite the limitations of his work, Tucker concludes that greater scrutiny of personal 
information by consumers ends up benefiting the platforms and advertisers who invest in 
them.  
A similar argument applies for e-commerce platforms: customers have to give away 
some data before making the purchase, but not all of them are necessarily related to the 
transaction. In concluding the transaction, customers can reveal credit card information but 
also other types of sensitive data, such as their behavior in the different websites or the “click 
path”, i.e. the user clicks sequences within an internet page or across different pages. This can 
be turned into price discrimination strategies at the expenses of consumers. 
 
1.4.1 The Model by Acquisti and Varian (2005) 
 
Acquisti and Varian (2005) proposed a model considering an online monopolist that is able to 
condition prices on the purchase history of customers. In their model, the seller can register 
the purchase decisions made by consumers through cookies, IP address, credit card number, 
user authentication; while customers can put in place some countermeasures to maintain their 
anonymity (e.g. cookie deletion, private browsing, etc). If the online behavior by customers 
can be tracked, the monopolist can price discriminate on the basis of the purchase history or 
“click-stream”. 
The model consists of two consecutive periods: each customer visits the firm’s website twice 
and in each period decides whether to purchase or not. In the first period, all customers visit 
the company’s website for the first time: the seller offers its price and each buyer decides if to 
purchase or not. Customers have heterogeneous preferences: a proportion of customers (π) 
can have a high willingness to pay (𝑣ℎ), while a proportion of consumers (1-π) can have a 
low willingness to pay (𝑣𝑙). However, in the first period the seller cannot discriminate: it only 
knows the proportion π, but it cannot observe the identity of each customer, that is whether 
he/she has high or low willingness to pay. In the second period, things may change: thanks to 
31 
the information stored in cookies, the seller can discriminate. In fact, after having observed 
the decision made by consumers the seller can condition its price on the customer’s purchase 
history.  
The aim of their model is to determine the optimal pricing strategy for the monopolist in three 
different cases: i) absence of price discrimination; ii) cookies not disabled and iii) customers 
disable cookies.  
The first case concerns the absence of price discrimination. In this case there is “privacy”: the 
information regarding the first period interactions cannot be used by the seller in the second 
period to price discriminate. This means that in each period the seller has to decide whether 
to set a low price (𝑣𝑙) selling to all customers or to set a high price (𝑣ℎ) selling to only a few 
customers. In this case, the seller decides to set the low price if and only if π𝑣ℎ < 𝑣𝑙; 
therefore its profits in each period are given bymax⁡{π𝑣ℎ , 𝑣𝑙}. 
The second case is that of cookies not disabled. In this scenario there is “no privacy”, 
meaning that the information regarding the first period interactions can be used in the second 
period to discriminate. Customers are “naive”: they do not expect the first period information 
to be used by the seller to discriminate in the second period. Therefore, the seller decides its 
prices in order to maximize the sum of its profits in the two periods. In order to recognize 
customers, the monopolist can set a price in the range [𝑣𝑙; 𝑣ℎ]: in this way customers with a 
high willingness to pay will end up purchasing the product, while customers with a low 
willingness to pay will not purchase. In the second period, having observed the customers’ 
purchase decision, the seller will charge 𝑣ℎ to customers that have previously bought and 𝑣𝑙 
to others in order to incentivize them to acquire at least once. In this way, if customers are 
“naive” the seller will leverage on the absence of privacy, thus discriminating: each customer 
will pay a price according to its willingness to pay and the monopolist profits are 2𝑣ℎ + (1 −
𝜋)𝑣𝑙. 
The third case is that of customers disabling cookies: we are still in the “no privacy” regime 
but consumers are “rational”. This means that customers can take some countermeasures: 
conscious of the potential discrimination, they decide not to buy in the first period in order to 
avoid to pay the high price in the second period. Let identify 𝑝ℎ and 𝑥ℎ as respectively the 
total price paid and total quantity acquired by the high-willingness-to-pay type of customer in 
the two periods; same reasoning for 𝑝𝑙 and 𝑥𝑙 for the low willingness-to-pay type of 
customer. The sellers chooses 𝑝ℎ, 𝑝𝑙, 𝑥ℎ, 𝑥𝑙 in order to maximize 𝑝ℎ + (1 − 𝜋)𝑝𝑙 subject to 
two constraints: 
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- Participation constraint: all customers prefer to buy rather than not to buy; 
- Incentive compatibility constraint: high willingness-to-pay type of customers prefer 
the offer set by the monopolist for high willingness-to-pay type of customers, same 
for low willingness to pay type of customers. 
In this case, the best strategy for the seller is to set 𝑝𝑙 = 𝑣𝑙 and 𝑝ℎ = 𝑣ℎ + 𝑣𝑙in order to 
induce high willingness-to-pay customers to buy in both periods and low willingness-to-pay 
type of customers to buy only in the second period. Therefore, both constraints are satisfied: 
high willingness-to-pay type of customers buy in both periods, obtaining a surplus of 𝑣ℎ − 𝑣𝑙 
and low willingness-to-pay type of customers do not buy at 𝑝ℎ = 𝑣ℎ + 𝑣𝑙. The fact that the 
seller has to deal with rational customers forces it to set a lower price in the first period in 
order to induce high willingness-to-pay types of customers to reveal themselves. In this third 
case, the monopolist seller ends up making profits equal to (1 − 𝜋)𝑝𝑙 + 𝑝ℎ = 𝜋𝑣ℎ + 𝑣𝑙 . 
Which is the optimal strategy for the firm? In order to answer we need to compare profits in 
the “no-privacy” regime and the monopolist canprice discriminate, 𝜋𝑣ℎ + 𝑣𝑙 , with those with 
privacy,⁡2max⁡{𝜋𝑣ℎ; 𝑣𝑙}, when the monopolist cannot price discriminate. Discrimination (“no 
privacy”) is optimal for the seller if 𝜋𝑣ℎ + 𝑣𝑙 > 2max⁡{𝜋𝑣ℎ; 𝑣𝑙} a condition which is never 
verified. This is due to the fact that the strategic behavior of high willingness to pay 
consumers forces the seller to set a lower price in the first period to induce them to buy (and 
to reveal themselves as high type consumers), and this make the discrimination strategy not 
profitable. The authors analyze extensions to this basic set-up and show that the “no-privacy” 
regime can become profitable when customers are less than perfectly rational. 
 
In the wake of the Acquisti and Varian model, Taylor (2004) studies price 
discrimination in the form of dynamic prices, building a model that predicts the presence of 
two monopolists and a continuum of consumers. In his model, companies collect personal 
information from consumers and derive value from the possibility to implement price 
discrimination strategies on the basis of customers’ preferences. Consumers can be of two 
types: either aware of the ways in which companies use personal data of individuals or naive. 
In the latter case, the surplus generated in a transaction is entirely absorbed by the company, 
and in fact only adequate regulation can intervene and change this balance. On the other 
hand, if consumers are aware of the use of their data made by companies, even in the absence 
of consumer privacy protection companies operate in the interest of customers, ending-up 
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protecting their privacy. In this way, Taylor demonstrates that consumer choices make 
deleterious for companies to practice privacy intrusion and violation of customers’ data. 
Villas-Boas (2004) proposes a work in which strategic consumers decide to be patient 
in the first period, learning about the product, and then deciding if or not to buy, thus 
anticipating future prices. This strategic action pushes companies to abandon price 
discrimination strategies in favor of the voluntary adoption of regulations aimed at protecting 
consumer privacy.  
A study by McKinsey (2020) revealed that people are becoming "increasingly 
intentional about the types of data they share and with whom": customers are more likely to 
share data that is a necessary part of interactions with organizations with the organization, 
while, on the other hand, some other data is more sensitive and in this way the power of trust 
becomes crucial. For example, McKinsey's survey revealed that people are more likely to 
share their data with companies that operate in some specific industries, such as companies 
operating in the healthcare industry. Additionally, another interesting finding was that 87% of 
respondents admitted that they were unwilling to do business with a company concerned 
about security practices. Moreover, half of the interviewees stated that they are more inclined 
to trust companies that ask for the necessary information, thus limiting the amount of 
personal and sensitive information communicated and transferred to companies. 
When a user is using the internet, browsing on their phone, subscribing to a certain 
social media platform, when completing an online transaction, when giving their consent or 
when using a supposedly free application, service or platform, companies are keeping track 
of the behavior of the user. Companies collect and use this information, and then they 
combine it with data about who the user interacts with, what store the user shops at, and they 
use that to figure out what the user might be interested in and build ads that they think are 
more likely to get us to click or buy. The information released make customers more 
vulnerable and exposed to a series of practices that may include target advertising, price 
discrimination, profiling. In addition, there is some data that is more sensible than others, 
such as data regarding health, opinions about politics, religion, or sexual orientation: these are 
all data that, if shared, can represent a serious threat for the individual. Through algorithms 
and more complex systems of data collection and analysis, even those data that are apparently 
less significant can be of enormous importance, because they can reveal a lot more about a 
person, i.e. attitudes, behaviors, lifestyle, habits, inner emotions. Information shared by users 
can also be transferred to third parties. Between 2017 and 2018, researchers at Oxford 
university analyzed approximately a third of the apps available in the Google Play Store and 
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found that the median app could transfer data to around ten third parties, with one in five apps 
able to share data with more than twenty third parties37. Their analysis showed that 88% of 
apps could have transferred data to third parties ultimately owned by Alphabet (i.e. Google), 
while 43% to businesses ultimately owned by Facebook. All of this data helps companies to 
create detailed profiles of customers. 
In 2020, with the introduction of iOS 14.5, iPadOS 14.5 and tvOS 14.5, Apple38 has 
introduced new and stricter privacy features for its applications. On one side, applications 
need to provide clear and transparent information on how they collect and utilize users’ data 
in the Apple Store: this allows users to understand the privacy policies adopted by an app 
before downloading it. On the other side, Apple introduces the "opt-in" regime: though the 
AppTrackingTransparency (ATT) framework, the individual consumer must provide his 
affirmative consent to allow companies to track users and the consent for tracking allows 
companies to: i) understand which websites, other applications and offline places consumers 
have visited to put in place targeted advertising; ii) share user-related or device-related data 
with third parties and/or data-brokers. As reported by a study of AppFlyer, by the time early 
adopters of the new Apple operating system were asked, “most users (99%) choose not to 
allow tracking”: consumers therefore revealed their tracking concerns by adopting an opt-in 
system that allowed them to obtain a greater level of privacy protection. However, as Apple 
itself expresses, there are still few but limited possibilities for applications to track users 
without obtaining their consent: for instance, data tracked can be shared with data-brokers for 
fraud detection, fraud prevention, security purposes, or to evaluate consumer’s 
creditworthiness. In addition, there are still doubts about Apple's ability to verify the actual 
compliance with the new privacy rules by these applications. 
Product customization requires possession of detailed customer information. In the 
digital world, for companies it is easier to recognize and collect data. Unlike the past, 
companies now have adequate tools to recognize which sites are searched for by online users, 
how they spend their time, and can even deduce additional information. When a product is 
personalized and oriented to the characteristics of specific customers or users, these same 
customers will end up assigning a higher value to those products. Product customization is 
also accompanied by a well-prepared pricing strategy, through which prices are established in 





At the fine line between public and private, the economics of privacy highlights 
tangible and intangible benefits and costs related to both the protection and disclosure of 
personal information. These can be advantages and disadvantages for the data-subject, i.e. the 
subject to whom such data refers, but also for companies and organizations collecting and 
using such information. 
- From an economic perspective, the process of personalization of contents seems to be 
efficient because on one side consumers are getting relevant content or potential 
benefits, while on the other hand firms can easily target customers. Consumers search 
for products that meet their needs and this potentially increases their welfare and 
reduces the search costs, but this is not always the case. For instance, users can benefit 
from posting a photo on social media or from receiving a highly personalized service 
(e.g. discounts or offers), but that same information, on the other hand, can be used to 
carry out target advertising or price discrimination practices or they can be victim of 
privacy-related issues. 
- Similarly, companies typically implement their strategies based on personal data at 
their disposal however they support some costs. For instance, through target 
advertising, companies can allocate the budget to the segment of customers which is 
theoretically more interested in their products. A comment that Hal Varian and Carl 
Shapiro make in their book is that when digitizing information, marginal costs of the 
good are collapsing, therefore this means that digital information is not costless. For 
instance, the cost that Facebook has to incur every day 48 just for running its network 
is significant, but the marginal cost of allowing one more participant to join the 
platform of Facebook is very small. 
In this context, decisions taken by economic agents play a fundamental role. Consider the 
data-subject: he can decide whether to reveal his personal information to receive a more 
personalized product or service, but with the risk of being a victim of target advertising; or he 
could decide to keep his privacy protected avoiding price discrimination practices but giving 
up potential benefits. Similarly, a company can decide to guarantee greater customer data 
protection by renouncing to implement personalized strategies in this way gaining trust 
especially among privacy-oriented consumers; or it can try to implement targeted strategies 
with the limits imposed by regulation in terms of privacy protection: in fact, if the company 
does not respect these rules, it can support negative consequences, such as fines or loss of 
reputation. 
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In the context of economics of privacy, and in general when there is an interaction 
between two agents on the basis of data (either released or collected), the decisions taken by 
economic agents significantly determine the final allocations of costs and benefits. This is 
done by considering how the allocation of personal data and information has an impact over 
the individual and total welfare (Brandimarte and Acquisti, 2012). 
In recent years, several papers have analyzed the consumer attitudes towards privacy 
and the trade-offs associated with the interaction between customers and firms willing to 
collect data about consumers in order to draw some conclusions and implications for policy-
makers. Different models have analyzed the ability of companies to profile customers and its 
implications in terms of individual privacy.  
Among others, Belleflamme, Lam and Vergote (2020) study a model of price 
competition between firms when they sell a homogeneous good and when they are able to 
profile consumers. However, in their model the profiling happens in an “imperfect" way: 
firms can identify consumers’ valuation for the product only imperfectly; therefore there is 
always a possibility that the consumer will remain anonymous. This means that companies 
end up with different profiling of customers, and therefore the nature of competition remains 
uncertain. 
Being aware of discriminatory practices adopted by businesses, consumers can also 
behave strategically (so-called “Hawthorne effect”), seeking to become anonymous to protect 
themselves from discrimination practices. Among the models treating the issue, we recall the 
aforementioned model by Acquisti and Varian (2005) where consumers, involved in a 
strategic interaction with firms, can hide their "cookies" so as not to be recognized by 
companies. In addition, in the model by Conitzer, Taylor, and Wagman (2012) and in the 
model of Montes, Zantman and Valletti (2019), consumers support a cost to maintain their 
anonymity; while in the model of Choi, Jeon and Kim (2019) the collection of data requires 
the consent of consumers.  
Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane (2015) proposed a model considering a mass 
of customers and two firms providing a homogeneous service but competing on two 
dimensions: price and privacy (or “disclosure”). Each firm enjoys two sources of revenue: 
one from the sales prices for the service they sell to consumers, the other from the sale of data 
on their consumers to third parties ("disclosure"). Consumers: i) are heterogeneous in their 
evaluation of the service; ii) provide their personal information only to the company from 
which they purchase the service (they may also not purchase any services, thus remaining out 
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of the market) to take advantage of any service personalization; and ii) do not want their data 
to be sold to third parties (i.e. they prefer the non-disclosure).  
The authors solved their model by backward induction: in the first stage, firms 
simultaneously decide the consumer information disclosure and in the second stage firms 
simultaneously set their prices. In the third stage, having observed disclosures and prices, 
customers decide if to sign up for the service of one firm or to stay out of the market; finally, 
in the fourth stage consumers who have subscribed a service decide the amount of 
information to provide to the related company.  
First of all, Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane analyzed the relationship between 
revenues and customer information (disclosure) which reveals two important trade-offs. The 
first one is associated with the revenue source: companies want to maximize their profits 
either by increasing the prices or the disclosure of consumers’ information. However, on one 
side the increase in price ends-up determining a lower demand for their services: the lower 
consumer base reduces the data stock that enables firms to extract revenues from the 
disclosure. On the other hand, if firms increase the level of disclosure in order to sell 
information to third parties, this will decrease the consumers’ willingness to pay for the 
service which ends-up reducing the revenues from the service. The second trade-off is 
associated with the level of disclosure set by companies: the higher the level of disclosure 
chosen by companies, the lower the amount of information disclosed by consumers; therefore 
each firm must find a balance between the stock of data obtained by consumers and the 
revenue from its disclosure to third parties. 
Then, authors analyzed how the privacy level affects the competition at the firms’ level. They 
concluded that privacy can actually soften competition when two conditions occur 
simultaneously: i) customers are heterogeneous so that firms can set differentiated privacy 
policies and ii) the consumers’ willingness to pay is not too high so that the two firms can 
operate profitably.  
The issue of privacy can be seen also analyzed by considering the effect of privacy 
and information disclosure and its societal consequences. Hillebrand and Hornuf (2021) 
analyzed the data donation process in the context of a "social dilemma", i.e. the situation in 
which individuals may be tempted to promote short-term benefits from non-cooperative 
behaviors, but found that in the long-term it would have been better to cooperate. The 
underlying idea is that individuals would be better off revealing personal information, thereby 
supporting a privacy risk (i.e. data leakage) but contributing to the social well-being, instead 
of not disclosing and freeriding on the contributions of others. This can happen because 
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individuals may be incentivized to do so if their underlying motivations lead them to prefer 
social well-being over personal utility. More specifically, their willingness to donate personal 
data (WDPD) increases when individuals perceive a strong moral obligation to donate and 
when they trust the institution to which people provide the data (i.e. they prefer academia or 





With the enormous diffusion of cutting-edge technologies and the enormous connectivity 
achieved, people always leave traces of themselves in the form of personal data: therefore, 
individual privacy is in serious danger. For their part, companies have unprecedented 
possibilities to collect, store, use and manage huge amounts of data at low cost. Companies 
have great incentives to collect user data, because this allows them to put into practice 
personalization and profiling strategies, which then translate into target advertising and price 
discrimination. 
Economists have dealt with the issue of privacy, revealing the many facets and fields of 
action in which the issue can be submitted. The economics of privacy, which is not a recent 
field, turns out to be a rather complex topic, which has undergone several evolutions in 
conjunction with the technological developments of the digital age. 
In the face of enormous concerns related to privacy and personal information, the legislation 
has tried to intervene with regulations aimed at favoring greater control for users on their 
personal data and greater transparency in how data is collected and managed. 
However, not only company collect data by themselves, but they also acquire customers’ data 
from the data market where data, its main resource, is exchanged. In this market, there are 
specific agents who occupy strategic roles: among the agents who play a role of 
intermediation we find the so-called data-brokers, of which consumers very often ignore the 
existence. 
In the next chapter we introduce the data market and then we will analyze in detail the data 
brokers.
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Chapter 2: The market of data and data-brokers 
 
In the first chapter we briefly discussed the economics literature on privacy. We have 
outlined the main characteristics and the multiple perspectives to which this broad topic can 
be subjected to. We have also identified the often negative consequences to which personal 
data and information of individual users can be subjected to. Not only is the privacy of 
individuals at risk, but what many people do not realize is that there is an ecosystem where 
data and personal information are traded and exchanged: the market of data. 
The market of data has specific agents operating within it and a common vision in this 
market is that data is treated as a precious resource. In this chapter, we analyze the data 
market starting from a definition and its main characteristics and features, then we will focus 
on the operations of some specific types of companies that, within this market, play a crucial 
role: data-brokers. 
2.1 The market of data 
 
Why a data market? On the one hand, it could be argued that personal data should not 
be subject to buying and selling: there are certain things, like electoral votes, that should not 
be for sale because they could undermine the spirit of democracy. On the other hand, the 
presence of a data market with the proper rules and norms drafted by regulators can put the 
right limitations to a market of enormous value for companies. In order to understand its 
benefits and risks, it is important to first analyze the characteristics of the market of data. 
The European Commission has defined the data market as “the market where digital 
data is exchanged as products or services derived from raw data”39. Despite a significant gap 
between Europe and the United States, the data market is expected to grow significantly in 
the coming years, mainly due to two main elements. First, the development and diffusion of 
data-based innovations also thanks to the contribution of artificial intelligence and other 
technological developments, which will have an ever-greater impact on economic growth. 
Second, by implementing international strategies promoting the benefits of the data market 
by giving responsibilities while protecting users. For example, at the European level, it can be 
 
39 European Commission (2020), The European Data Market Monitoring Tool 
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mentioned proposals such as the “European Digital Agenda”, the “Strategy for the Digital 
Single Market”, the “Europe 2020 Strategy” and the “European Union Action Plan for 
eGovernment”. Moreover, to foster a digital single market, the European Commission has 
created the "Free Flow of (non-personal) data" initiative with the aim of promoting the 
economy of data and related technologies, products and services that use data40.  
From the definition of data market, a first important consideration is that data is seen 
as the main resource, something that has some value and is treated as an object of exchange. 
For companies, having data does not always mean having access to the information contained 
within it: sometimes the content can be processed or extrapolated from the raw data, and in 
this case raw data has only potential value. The content, unlike the data itself, requires an 
interpretation based on knowledge, and most of the time this process involves the presence of 
specific companies in possession of the necessary skills. This distinction is important because 
at a functional level, the generation of economic value on data is crucial for evaluating and 
defining property rights on data from a legislative point of view.  
Over time, data has changed its role and its contribution in an emerging data 
economy, especially in relation to the digital transformation. 
 Drexl (2017) analyzed the different contributions that data had in relation to 
technological developments. In the beginning, the Internet was used as an information and 
sales platform and an information society was emerging: essentially, the foundations for the 
creation and proliferation of data had been laid. In a subsequent phase, new types of services 
were offered to consumers, mainly financed through advertising: in this phase data were 
identified as an input of great potential for the emergence of business models based on data 
and information. Basically, the underlying idea was that the value of a service or platform 
increased the more they were attractive to consumers, which were willing to share personal 
data and information in exchange of a perceived value or benefit. With the advent of the 
Internet of Things (IoT), connectivity has become key, both in the physical and digital sphere 
but also among the two: this step led to an increase in data and an extension of the data 
collected. Data can now be used in different areas, or combined with each other to analyze 
and predict human behaviors, consumer habits, or general correlations (e.g. "data mining") 




market, data are seen as highly sustainable, non-rival, and traded in an active market at a low 
marginal cost41.  
Since data is characterized by a great variety, it is necessary to distinguish data not 
only in terms of types of data, but also according to the source42.  
A first important distinction is between raw data and processed data. This distinction 
implies that raw data is not always of value to companies. Sometimes, companies and 
organizations need to work on data that has already gone through a primordial process that 
has given it shape and meaning, or a usable content. As we will see later, there are companies 
that deal precisely with organizing and processing data, adding value to the data and allowing 
it to be processed, which is essential if we think of the huge volumes of data nowadays 
generated. 
A second distinction is between the spheres of personal and non-personal data, which 
gave rise to a debate on privacy issues and the subject of property law. Personal data are data 
that, directly or indirectly, refer to an identified or identifiable natural person, while non-
personal data are not related to an identified or identifiable natural person, or whose link to 
the natural person was present in the past but now the relationship does not hold anymore. 
This is important because the application of the rules within the GDPR (i.e. the European 
legislation on data protection) depends precisely on this distinction. 
A third distinction is between static and dynamic data. Static data is data that cannot 
be changed during its processing. Examples of static data include a newspaper article, which 
can be read but the data source cannot be changed, or a CD ROM, which is not changed 
during processing. On the contrary, dynamic data is data that changes during its processing: 
when the data is re-entered they are never the same, but they are constantly changing. For 
example, a CD RW that can be rewritten or edited. Generally speaking, dynamic data are 
better suited to contexts in which there is a need to quickly update information, and where 
there is a need for receiving contributions from different agents, while statistical data has 
more limitations. 
Another interesting difference is about the data utilization: data can be used both as an 
input and as a output. Generally, data are used as input for improving marketing and targeting 
campaigns, as well as to improve the personalization of products and services. On the 
contrary, data are sold as output in the forms of data packages or data products: this happens, 
 
41 European Commission (2017), The economics of ownership, access and trade in digital data, 
JRC104756 
42 Cambridge International AS & A Level Information Technology (2017). Types of data 
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for instance, when a data-broker or a marketing agency sell these data to other companies or 
third parties. 
For what concerns the source, a big distinction is between direct and indirect data 
source. Direct data sources represent sources where data are collected for a particular or 
specific purpose. These are also called “original sources”, since there is no need to gather the 
information from other third parties; such as questionnaires or interviews. On the contrary, 
indirect data sources are those sources that collect data for a specific reason, but that can use 
them for another. This happens for example when a company or organization collects data on 
individuals of a commercial nature, and then decides to resell this data to third parties, to 
identifies specific categories of individuals with specific characteristics, or to use it to 
implement strategies such as price discrimination or target advertising. 
Generally, if on the one hand direct sources personally take responsibility for the 
processing, storage and use of data on the basis of the consent of each individual, on the other 
hand indirect sources represent a greater source of risk for the consumer. With the possibility 
for companies to collect data quickly and easily, companies can collect information about 
consumers indirectly, without even knowing about these practices. This information is of 
great quality for businesses, but it seriously endangers individual privacy. 
 These characteristics have reflected the proliferation of digital devices, sensors and 
services as a result of the expansion of the digital economy. In fact, the overall impacts of the 
data market on the economy as a whole are measured in the value of the “Data Economy”, 
which is actually expected to grow faster than the data market (European Commission, 2020). 
 Drexl (2017) identifies the main characteristics of a data market, in relation to its 
primary source, data: 
- "Volume": huge volume of data produced by several sources are of enormous volume, 
so large that it dominates the capacity of the storage and treatment systems; 
- "Velocity" which recalls the dynamic nature of big data, which changes constantly, 
almost in real time.  
- “Veridicity”, since there is a need for data to be reliable, also from a legal standpoint. 
- "Variety" or the wide variety of types and formats of data, which can also come from 
very different sources, that can be combined to find conclusions, correlations and to 
give sense to the aggregated information. 
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The more data a company has at its disposal, the more power the company can 
exercise: for example, the possession of data by a company could allow it to decide who to 
sell to and at what price. Moreover, a lot of data is not exchanged and there are no alternative 
sources for obtaining it: this undoubtedly makes competition less fierce. In addition, there are 
other strategies companies can use to limit competition. First, strategic data-driven mergers to 
leverage economies of scale and cost efficiency. Second, continuous data collection in their 
own platforms to remain competitive and creating barriers to entry. Third, the creation of a 
strategic presence in different segments in order to exploit the interoperability of data and to 
be able to collect more information about the same user. However, the fact that some data is 
not exchanged does not always prevent new players from overcoming the entry barriers: for 
instance, the large amount of data held by a big company like Facebook has not prevented the 
development of other platforms such as Snapchat. In conclusion, the competitive advantage 
derives from the use made of data and from the organizational skills that this use entails for 
companies. 
Before the advent of digital and information technologies (ITCs), the cost of 
production, the marginal cost of storage, use, distribution and transposition were particularly 
high. With the introduction of digital technologies, on the other hand, information and data 
can be stored, replicated and transmitted electronically, quickly and economically and 
sustained with a significantly lower energy cost than though analog information systems. 
Moreover, unlike the past, modern digital information reduces information to its most basic 
expression, made up of a minimum number of distinguishable states necessary to detect 
information, that is, a two-state binary format, 0 and 1. The binary digital system constitutes a 
universally shared information format, and this greatly facilitates data transposition and 
connectivity between different digital devices.  
The significant proliferation of digital devices, sensors and services as a result of the 
expansion of the digital economy has resulted in a considerable volume of data. Moreover, in 
the data market, information technologies have significantly lowered the costs of collecting, 
using and distributing data, as well as reducing search costs. The use of algorithms has also 
helped companies and data brokers to overcome the problem of noise deriving from an 
increasing need by companies to collect, store and manage huge amounts of data. Therefore, 
companies and organizations can leverage economies of scale and scope.  
The processing and content extraction of data and their information can be performed 
in different ways and with different degrees of complexity. One tool often used is machine 
learning. With the introduction of constantly-updated data and information, these models are 
44 
constantly improving. Economies of scope are closely related to these types of models: when 
two sets of data overlap each other, even partially, the cost to extract knowledge from the two 
together is lower than the cost to do it separately for each data set. Therefore, economies of 
scope resulting from joint learning produces more benefits and fosters the creation of more 
insights. Additionally, algorithms and information learned from one dataset can in some cases 
be transposed to other datasets or extended to adjacent areas of analysis. Conversely, 
avoiding economies of scope by separately applying algorithms or machine learning systems 
could lead to greater cost and less significant results in terms of combinations of data and 
insights and insights into information. 
In general, economies of scope allow companies and data intermediaries to obtain 
lower costs for collecting and analyzing data. Furthermore, they allow us to better understand 
why companies are led to collect an increasing amount of data on individuals, overcoming 
the noise that could be generated by an excessive amount of information. On the other hand, 
however, economies of scope are subject to returns that decrease over time and therefore do 
not last forever.  
Another important aspect of the data market is interoperability, i.e. the process by 
which information and data is made useful between systems, applications or components. 
Information interoperability is quite interesting in the context of technological information 
systems as it promotes trade, innovation, reactivity to market challenges, and it lowers costs 
(especially communication costs), adds flexibility to the decision-making process and it also 
helps to lower the barriers between market players. Generally speaking, in an increasingly 
digitized world, the benefits of interoperability significantly outweigh its costs and challenges 
(Palfrey and Gasser, 2012).  
The interoperability has provided significant characteristics to the data market: 
barriers to entry are significantly reduced, an easy access to data, and the possibility for 
different actors to extract value from the content contained therein. Moreover, compared to 
traditional economy, in the data economy value is generated differently and in a way that 
reflects digital transformation (Drexl, 2017): while the traditional economy generally refers to 
vertical value chains in which every step of the chain, from inputs to output, is adding 
economic value sequentially, in the data economy the ideal framework involves a complex 
and dynamic paradigm in which several contributors can simultaneously add value. This is 
why in the data market, through collaborations and interconnections, new products, services 
and firms can easily arise. 
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The development of cutting-edge digital technologies has also made it increasingly 
easier to observe user behavior. Users are perennially connected: they do research, 
communicate and entertain. Basically, they can use any application or platform they want and 
need to achieve very different purposes. All of this has side effects: this connectivity and 
these online activities create a huge amount of data, which can be also traded among firms. In 
the same way, the data market has created some concerns linked to the processing, storage 
and treatment of personal data and information of individuals. 
Privacy executives have sought, through a pragmatic approach, to manage the sharing 
of personal data through guidelines on collection, processing and sharing, in both national 
and public interest. Despite this, OECD countries have not always embraced these directives 
and most member states have declared that they have adopted them only in more recent 
years43. Digital security incidents are potentially very risky, not just for businesses and 
governments, but for individuals as well. 
Since there can be lots of problems in terms of data protection, this has required the 
intervention of legislation. A first distinction between property on the data set in the form of 
bits and bytes, and property on the information that a dataset contains. When data is stored in 
a company server, from a legislative point there is a first problem of intervention. A second 
distinction is between the “syntactic” and the “semantic” level: while the former concerns the 
representation of information in different ways and is generally accessible to all (e.g. video or 
a digital book), the semantic level refers to the meaning that can be extracted from a 
representation of information, something not necessarily accessible to everyone (e.g. the 
meaning of a book results accessible only to whom is able to understand the language). A 
third distinction is between the protection of each individual data information and between 
the protection of the entire dataset in its entirety and composition.  
The identification of a data market implies that there are specific agents operating 
within it44. Among these agents, there can be identified data professionals, whose core 
business is related to the analysis, management, organization, visualization and storage of 
data and information. Data professionals are operators capable of handling huge amounts of 
data, and are characterized by being at the forefront of database technologies. For this reason, 
data professionals are characterized by particular resources, capabilities and skills to carry out 
their work and the demand and supply for these skills has been growing strongly in recent 
times both at the European and international level.  
 
43 OECD digital economic outlook 2020 
44 The European Data Market Monitoring Tool (2020) 
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In addition to data professionals, in the data market there can also be identified data 
companies, so organizations “directly involved in the production, delivery and/or usage of 
data in the form of digital products, services and technologies”. The two main types of data 
companies are data suppliers, which continue to generate an increase in their revenue year-
on-year, and data users. The main activity of data suppliers concerns the production and the 
supply of products, services and technologies related to digital data, while data users are 
those companies and organizations that improve their businesses leveraging on the collection, 
organization and proper usage of data and the information contained within. 
This classification of the different roles occupied by different agents, however, is not 
unique: in fact, there can be agents who are both data professionals and data providers, such 
as data brokers. Data-brokers therefore may have the necessary skills to process and analyze 
data, but also the ability to organize and resell the collected and arranged data. This in fact 
denotes a certain complexity in the data market, where different market agents can cover 
multiple roles, occupying in this sense a more strategic role. 
2.2 Data-brokers 
 
In general, companies collect information about customers on different aspects: 
preferences and hobbies, habits, health, purchase history and transactions, friends and other 
contacts, credit score, location. Companies not only collect data about customers, but they 
can buy these data from other companies called “data-brokers”, which are “companies that 
collect consumers’ personal information and resell or share that information with others” 
(Federal Trade Commission)45. 
According to a 2020 research by NATO Strategic Communications Centre of 
Excellence, there are around 5,000 data brokers worldwide, registering an industry of around 
$178 billion of revenues. These include companies such as Acxiom, Experian, Equifax, 
CoreLogic, Lifelock and TowerData. Moreover, there are around 10 million open datasets 
and around 4,8 billion internet users globally. However, the global data economy is projected 
to reach $400 billion with 175 zettabytes of data produced worldwide by 202546. One of the 
main data-brokers is the American company Acxiom, which has recently been renamed 
LiveRamp. The company has over 20,000 servers for collecting and analyzing data on over 
700 million people around the world. In 2018, in its website, the company reported that 
 
45 FTC (2014), Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability 
46Nato Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (2020): Data Brokers and Security 
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“Acxiom has the most expansive and compliant data offering in the world, which now 
encompasses more than 62 countries, 2.5 billion addressable consumers and more than 
10,000 attributes—for a comprehensive representation of 68 percent of the world’s online 
population”47. 
Data-brokers tend to specialize in certain sectors or market niches with the aim of 
obtaining a competitive advantage. Data can be collected from a variety of sources, mainly 
commercial, government, publicly available information and online tracking. Data collected 
by data-brokers are sorted and used for a variety of purposes, e.g. marketing and advertising 
or commercial aims. In addition, other additional information can be deduced from the data 
that the data brokers have at their disposal. Data-brokers usually exchange data even among 
themselves or they can buy data from other companies collecting data in order to have very 
accurate datasets. However, with the introduction of the European GDPR, the sharing of data 
between data-brokers without the authorization of customers is considered illegal (Gu, Madio 
and Reggiani, 2021). 
These characteristics reveals an industry characterized by strong complexities and 
different layers of activities.This complexity is significant if we also consider that there are 
multiple layers of data-brokers in the process starting with the collection of raw data and 
finishing with the sale of organized data to its end customers. Bergemann and Bonatti (2012) 
distinguish data providers into financial data providers (e.g. Bloomberg and Thomson 
Reuters), credit rating agencies (e.g. Equifax, Moody's, Standard & Poor’s), data brokers (e.g. 
LexisNexis and Acxiom) and online aggregators (e.g. Spokeo and Intelius).  
Data-brokers aggregate data and create marketable products, such as access to their 
database, lists based on observed data, data about subgroups of consumers with similar 
characteristics and behaviors and whose future behavior is predicted based on past actions. 
For instance, data-brokers can assign a score that can be used to predict the likely behavior of 
current or potential consumers. These companies typically sell their products to downstream 
companies, which acquire them to improve the positioning of their products and their 
strategies in general. 
The data collected and analyzed by data-brokers can be used to make further 
inferences about them, even (and in a more risky way for the user) at the level of sensitive 
data. Subsequently, on the basis of these inferences, sub-categories of users can be created. 





others may be based precisely on sensitive or partially sensitive data (usually based on 
ethnicity, income or conditions of health, according to the 2014 Federal Trade Commission 
report). An example of sensitive categories can be "expectant parent", "diabetes interest" and 
"cholesterol focus". When data and information are combined, the added value that is 
obtained is significant. Each small piece of data that is combined with other information 
related to the same individual allows companies to create rather precise profiles of 
individuals. These profiles can also be organized into a large multitude of categories, each of 
which has different characteristics and behaviors, some of them more wide and general, while 
others more narrow and even sensitive. Ultimately, these aggregated data are then used to 
predict behaviors of individuals and therefore are of particular interest to many firms that can 
acquire them to implement or improve their strategies, e.g. target advertising, personalized 
services but also to adopt price discrimination strategies. Data-brokers can also combine data 
online with offline data, and then offer organized data packages to market online, then sell 
them to companies. This is often done through tools such as websites that use registration 
functions (e.g. cookies) to "find online consumers and target them with Internet 
advertisements based on their offline activities" (FTC, 2014). Then, as long as the cookies 
remain in the browsers of customers, data-brokers can continuously offer targeted offers 
every time the consumer surfs on the Internet. Most of the time, this happens in consumer 
non-awareness. 




Source: Adapted from Birckan, Dutra, Macedo and Godoy Viera (2020). 
 
This graphical representation shows how data-brokers typically work. The process starts with 
the data collection from varieties of sources: customers release a lot of detailed information 
about themselves. Then there is a process aimed at organizing and sorting the information 
collected: the consumer information is put together and combined and the end result is a very 
detailed profiling of the individual or sub-groups. Finally, the information collected and 
organized is typically sold as a data product to downstream customers of the data-brokers, 
typically firms willing to obtain and access these data. 
The ability of data brokers to collect information has also been favored by the 
advancement of new and increasingly sophisticated technologies, such as the use of 
algorithms, machine learning and artificial intelligence, but also by increasingly lower 
storage costs. Technology has also allowed data-brokers to easily store information and this 
can happen, for instance, in view of future business strategies, but data stored is not always 
secure, and in fact this data can be the target of malicious people aiming at stealing this 
information for less benevolent purposes.  
Some customers may claim to benefit from having personalized enhanced services or 
lower transaction costs, but the risk to which customers and their data are exposed is not 
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irrelevant. Depending on the work of data-brokers, consumers can have benefits in terms of 
offering products and advertising that consumers can find relevant because they need, prefer, 
or are looking for them. Some data broker products can even help to prevent fraud, for 
example there are data-brokers such as ID Analytics whose product is related to risk 
mitigation. 
While on one side data-brokers may offer some benefits, on the other hand they can 
create significant risks for the users concerned. For example, associating a consumer with a 
specific category or subcategory could make them more vulnerable to higher payment rates 
when taking out insurance policies: a person suffering from diabetes could be targeted 
advertising specific products at higher prices. In the same way, the possibility to store 
consumer data at lower costs and for indefinite periods of time, as well as the possibility of 
updating them continuously, could expose consumers to security and privacy risks and 
potentially leading to identity theft, theft of information related to their habits, personal 
passwords, information related to credit cards, security codes and financial frauds. 
Consumers can be at risk as these companies sell or share their data. The problem is 
that this often happens without the consumer being aware of these practices and therefore 
potentially unable to request what information about them is held and with which companies 
it is exchanged. There are few reasons for which data-brokers represents a threat for 
customers (Twetman et al., 2014): 
1. Violation of Privacy. Most of the times, the activity of data-brokers happens without a 
direct and transparent interaction between customers and data-brokers: these 
companies treat data of individuals without their consent, or without their knowledge 
or awareness.  
2. Data exposure. One of the activities of data brokers concerns the storage of 
information, which makes them potential victims of hackers or cybercriminals. Lack 
of security practices exposes consumers to many risks, especially if sensitive 
information and data are exposed. In the past, data-brokers such as Acxiom, Epsilon 
and Experian have been hacked. 
3. Advertising and targeting. Among the various categories, there are data brokers who 
sell data for the purpose of targeted advertising. These practices often occur in 
violation of privacy and consumers can be heavily influenced by them. 
4. Exploitation. In this case we refer to the fact that personal data can be used in harmful 
and unethical ways, for example data breaches, identity theft, phishing attacks, credit 
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card skimming. For example, in 2019, Marriott reported a record 383 million guests 
exposed to data breaches48. 
 
Consumers may be unaware of the presence of these companies, or they may not 
know exactly how their data is collected and processed. Moreover, the problem is that, even 
if they wanted to, consumers cannot easily consult and verify the data that these companies 
have at their disposal. 
One example of issues in relation to activities done by data-brokers is represented by 
what has happened with the Cambridge Analytica scandal. 
In 2014 Aleksandr Kogan, at the time a researcher at the University of Cambridge, 
developed an application called “This is your digital life” with the aim of creating 
“psychological profiles” based on the activities carried out by online users, e.g. manifested 
preferences, comments, involvement in some specific groups and communities. With the 
consent of Facebook, this application could have access not only to the profiles of single 
users, but also to their contact list: this made it possible to collect data for an amount of 
approximately 50 million total users49. Data was then transferred to Cambridge Analytica, a 
British data mining and political strategy firm.Cambridge Analytica entered in possession and 
then analyzed these data also with the help of very sophisticated algorithms to finally define 
an accurate psychological profile for each user with specific information related to their 
interests, behaviors, and even emotions. The aim was to create and show, for each of these 
profiles, highly targeted and personalized political contents.  
In 2016, Cambridge Analytica was accused of having obtained and misused the data collected 
to work on the presidential campaign on Donald Trump, adopting practices and strategies 
aimed at leveraging the targeting of voters, also thanks to an improper use of Facebook. This 
happened in the absence of transparency for the individuals involved and their data. In fact, 
the strategy of Cambridge Analytica was aimed, by using Facebook data, to identify 
subgroups of voters to create and design messages and content aimed at persuading and 
influencing their opinion: the company has essentially tried to identify target profiles which, 
through well calibrated strategies, were able to influence their choices effectively. In 2012, 
something similar had already happened during the presidential campaign of Obama, but at 
 
48 Bloomberg, Marriott Says Only 383 Million Guests Exposed in Breach, January 4, 2019 
49 The Guardian, “Revealed: 50 million Facebook profiles harvested for Cambridge Analytica in major 
data breach”, March 17, 2018 
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that time the voters had been informed about those practices and it was happening in 
accordance with the rules of Facebook. 
When the affair emerged, Facebook was accused of not paying enough attention to user data 
and protecting their privacy. This resulted in a campaign called “#DeleteFacebook”, which 
resulted in the deletion of numerous profiles from the platform. Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of 
Facebook, was finally subjected to an investigation by government institutions50. 
The multitude of issues that arose in relation to the practices conducted by data-
brokers have required the intervention of regulators. In fact, the activity of data-brokers has 
been put under investigation, together with the need to protect privacy of customers and 
individuals in relation to their activities. 
 In 2014, the Federal Trade Commission reported some interesting results about an in-
depth analysis of nine data-brokers collecting information about customers from different 
sources (e.g. government, commercial and public available sources), and offering products 
and services for a variety of purposes (e.g. marketing, risk mitigation and people search). The 
conclusion of this analysis was that, despite data-brokers have at their disposal increasingly 
sophisticated tools for collecting general and sensitive data about customers, together with 
the possibility to infer new information about them and the sub-groups created, the data-
brokers industry and the commercial data market continue to present various problems. In 
particular, a general lack of transparency towards individuals and a lack of clarity on the 
methods used to manage the data collected on them. Another remarkable result of the report 
was that, in considering the nine data brokers examined, "one of the nine data brokers has 
3000 data segments for nearly every U.S. consumer" (Federal Trade Commission, p. V). 
Differently from ordinary goods, when dealing with the economics of data trading a 
buyer must evaluate the information before purchasing the information and ultimately decide 
his willingness to pay. This means that the seller needs to disclose some of the information it 
possesses. But when this disclosure occurs, the buyer no longer has any incentive to pay for 
what is ultimately shown to them. This problem is referred to as the “Arrow Information 
Paradox”. To solve this paradox, intellectual property and property rights can be used: when 
information is protected through the use of patents or copyrights, it can be disclosed without 
the risk that the seller will not receive any compensation. However, this paradox may not be 
always valid: there are heterogeneous data that are composed of several parts, and the partial 
 
50 BBC, Cambridge Analytica: Facebook 'being investigated by FTC', March 20, 2018 
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disclosure does not necessarily reveal the whole information. Moreover, the use of 
contractual relationships or relationships based on trust allow the exchange of information51. 
The cost structure of data sellers is typical of the markets for information products. In 
fact, it is generally characterized by high fixed costs (e.g. costs to implement the necessary 
infrastructures and data processing technologies) and by low marginal costs.These sellers 
must then decide on pricing strategies as well. Setting a price for information is no easy task: 
typically, an "information good" is priced based on the value it has for its consumers, and not 
as an increase in unit cost. However, “since people have widely different values for a 
particular piece of information, value-based pricing leads naturally to differential pricing” 
(Shapiro and Varian, 1998). Pricing can vary according to some factors, such as the 
competition among sellers, the interaction between data providers and customers, the setting 
considered (e.g. monopoly, Hotelling setting, or two-sided platform) and also according to 
the demand by buyers. Among the interaction between buyers and sellers of data, we have to 
consider the possibility of the data-broker to discriminate among buyers, therefore the 
possibility of offering an exclusivity to only one or more firms.  
 In recent years, thanks to increasingly sophisticated tracking tools and data analysis 
capabilities, data-brokers have found it easier to collect and organize consumer information. 
The lack of transparency in the practices conducted by data brokers and the concerns 
associated with it has given rise to specific regulations for data brokers (Federal Trade 
Commission, 2014). In the 2012 "Privacy Report"52, the US Commission discussed the 
privacy concerns raised by the practices of data-brokers and identified different uses for the 
information they collect (i.e. entities subject to FRCA, companies related to marketing 
practices, companies related to non-marketing practices outside the FRCA) and identified two 
main recommendations to increase transparency of data brokerage firms: 
1. Providing consumers access to the information that data-brokers collect about them; 
2. Providing data-brokers with guidelines to improve their transparency, for example by 
describing how they collect information about consumers, informing consumers about 
the types of companies to which the data is transferred, etc. 
 
51 European Commission, The economics of ownership, access and trade in digital data, 2017 
52 Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations For Businesses and 




In 2013, the United States Government Accountability Office released a report on the 
practices conducted by data brokers, concluding that the US Commission should intervene in 
a more marked way thanks to legislative intervention. In 2014, two bills entitled "Data 
Broker Accountability and Transparency Act" and "The Data Accountability and Trust Act of 
2014" were introduced with the aim of improving the transparency of data intermediaries and 
their practices, leading them to make the information collected available on each consumer. 
However, the activities of data brokers are not limited only to the US borders: today 
these companies operate globally. Therefore, the activities of data brokers have been 
subjected to the careful analysis of international legislation. 
More recently it has been issued the California Consumer Privacy Act (2018) that, 
together with other rules, norms and legislation, has also treated issues related to data-
subjects. Among other things, from January 1, 2020 the CCPA allows a consumer the “right 
to request a business to disclose the categories and specific pieces of personal information 
that it collects about the consumer, the categories of sources from which that information is 
collected, the business purposes for collecting or selling the information, and the categories 
of third parties with which the information is shared”53. In addition, California law requires 
data-brokers to register annually with the Attorney General and to “provide information on 
how consumers can opt out of the sale of their personal data”.  
 
2.2.1 Literature on data-brokers 
 
The literature on data intermediaries has tried to analyze the main characteristics of 
the data market and the strategic role that data brokers play as data providers. Typically, the 
setting proposed by these models presents an upstream data market with the presence of one 
or more data-brokers, and a downstream firm market with one or more firms operating within 
it. Companies buy data from the upstream market to get more precise information on 
consumers' willingness to pay, then implementing discriminatory strategies, mainly price 
discrimination and target advertising. These models also offer important conclusions for the 
drafting of privacy policies, as they allow to shift attention to the still unclear and transparent 
practices that are at the basis of the data market and the work of data intermediaries. 
 A first strand of literature analyzes a data market characterized by a single upstream 
monopolistic data-broker, who enjoys decision-making power when offering their data to 
 
53 California Legislative Information (2019), AB-1355 Personal information 
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downstream companies. For instance, when selling its data, the data-broker can decide to 
offer its data exclusively to only one downstream firm. 
 Clavorà Braulin and Valletti (2016) build a model by considering an upstream data 
broker selling its information about consumers’ preference to two firms competing 
downstream. In particular, the data intermediary can decide whether to sell their data to both 
downstream firms or to offer its data through an exclusivity agreement to only one firm. The 
authors conclude that the vendor always has an incentive to sell their data exclusively, 
however this creates allocative inefficiencies. The first best of their model is in fact obtained 
when the data-broker sells to both companies, however this result never emerges in 
equilibrium. The conclusions are then converted into policy suggestions aiming at regulating 
the exclusive sale of data by data intermediaries. 
Montes, Zantman and Valletti (2019) illustrates a model considering three agents: 
consumers, firms and a data supplier. In their setting, companies are willing to obtain data 
from the data-broker in order to implement price discrimination practices, while consumers 
can avoid to be the target of these strategies by supporting a “privacy cost”. However, the 
authors conclude that, in equilibrium, the data-broker ends up selling its customers’ data to 
only one of the firms by offering the exclusivity. Their result is then translated into 
suggestions for the drafting of privacy policies: similarly to Clavorà Braulin and Valletti 
(2016), policymakers should discourage exclusivity agreements and ensure consumers greater 
privacy protection. 
 In addition to selling its own data exclusively, the monopolistic data-broker can also 
choose the amount of data to offer to downstream companies, acting on the quantity. 
 Bounie, Dubus, and Waelbroecker (2020) create a model in which a monopolistic 
data-broker can strategically decide the amount of information to sell to competing firms, 
eager to obtain it for price discrimination practices. The setting is represented by an Hotelling 
line: the amount of information sold partitions this line into segments of consumers’ 
information and firms buying these segments of information can set specific prices to target 
customers. The aim of this model is to understand how the competition at the firms’ level is 
affected by the quantity of information provided by the data-broker to the market. The data-
broker can weaken (no or little customers’ information sold) or strengthen (all customers’ 
information sold) the intensity of competition at the level of companies. The authors conclude 
that the data-broker strategically sells partial (incomplete) information about consumers, 
thereby weakening competition at the firm level. 
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 Another strand of literature does not consider a monopolistic data-broker, but the 
presence of more than one data-broker in the upstream data market. This implies that there 
may be two alternatives: i) the data brokers compete with each other, ii) the data-brokers 
decide to cooperate with each other. 
 Ichihashi (2020) proposes a competition model between data intermediaries in the 
data market. Data brokers collect personal consumer data under compensation and then resell 
it to downstream companies. The assumption is that the data provided by consumers is non-
rival: consumers can offer the same data to different intermediaries, thereby obtaining 
compensation from each intermediary. The compensation given to consumers by data 
intermediaries is important: if this is sufficiently high, intermediaries will offer the data to 
downstream firms at a lower price. For this reason, data-brokers will offer a low reward for 
the data offered by consumers. In his model, the author argues that upstream competition 
benefits consumers. However, if the data purchased by downstream firms is used in a harmful 
way towards customers (i.e. firms use data to extract the maximum possible consumer 
surplus), consumers end up supporting the negative impacts that would occur with the 
presence of a single monopolist data-broker. 
Gu, Madio and Reggiani (2021) propose a model concerning the role of data-brokers 
supplying information to downstream firms (i.e. data-buyers). The authors 
distinguishbetween "sub-additive" and "super-additive" data, according to the lower (sub-) or 
higher (super-) value of the merged data in respect to the sum of the separated dataset. 
Depending on the nature of data (i.e. sub- or super-additive) and on the cost for merging data, 
data-brokers can decide whether to compete or to share their data between each other. The 
authors conclude that in some circumstances data-brokers can be incentivized to share their 
data between each other: more specifically, data sharing happens when data-brokers are more 
efficient than data-buyers in merging datasets. However, data-sharing practices among data-
brokers have been subject to regulation: for instance, the European GDPR has enacted more 
stringent rules deciding, among other things, that data-brokers cannot exchange data without 
consumers’ permission. Therefore, even if there can be positive externalities and pro-
competitive effects deriving from data-sharing, their analysis reveals that regulators should 







In this section we have presented the data market, highlighting its main characteristics. The 
main resource of this market is data which is treated, transformed, stored, managed and 
traded among specific market actors. Within this context, a crucial role is played by data-
brokers. The data market still has some dark sides, and many practices within it remain 
unclear. Furthermore, there is still little transparency in the way consumer data is collected, 
processed and stored by data-brokers. In 2014, the Federal Trade Commission intervened 
with an in-depth study on data-brokers entitled "Data-brokers: a call for transparency and 
accountability", which highlighted the main issues concerning data intermediaries and their 
practices.  
The literature on data brokers has also analyzed the structure of the data market by presenting 
models with data-buyers and data-sellers, finding interesting ideas for drafting privacy 
policies. 
In the next chapter we analyze a model involving a monopolist data-broker that can decide 
the price for its data and two downstream firms willing to obtain its data. The price set by 
data-brokers significantly affects the outcome of the equilibrium and on the level of privacy 
protection of customers. Finally, we will also propose some conclusions and suggestions for 
the policy-makers. According to the literature on data-brokers shown in this chapter, our 
model will find a lot of similarities with the strain that considers a monopolistic data-broker 
that has a certain power when selling its data to downstream firms, especially because it is 
able to set the price for the data it possesses. Among the literature previously presented, our 
model will be close to the models of Clavorà Braulin and Valletti (2016) and Bounie, Dubus, 
and Waelbroecker (2020). 
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Chapter 3: The role of data-brokers in a vertically 
related market 
 
Thanks to technological progress, companies are able to collect, store, share or sell 
specific customer information, which usually can be used to implement targeted advertising 
and differentiated pricing. This has given rise to growing concerns regarding the protection of 
personal data, which require an ever more significant intervention in terms of regulations and 
legislation, not only for what concerns data protection, but also in relation to competition 
between companies, also considering that the role of data has become crucial in establishing 
competitive power. Companies are incentivized to obtain data on users and consumers, since 
they can implement highly personalized strategies. Among their possibilities, companies can 
also buy data from data-brokers, data intermediaries operating within the market of data. 
We therefore condensate these elements into a model characterized by a vertical 
related industry with an upstream data-broker who collects and sells data to two downstream 
firms competing and using data to price discriminate consumers. Our aim is to determine not 
only the incentives for the two downstream firms to use the data provided by the data-broker, 
but also the incentive for the data-broker to set a price for its data that enables only one or 
both firms to buy it. We then conclude discussing the impact of such strategies on market 
efficiency, and some implications for policy-makers involved in the drafting of privacy 
policies. 
The starting point of our analysis will be a recent model by Shy and Stenbacka 
(2016), where the authors analyze and compare the impact of different privacy regimes on 
firms’ profits and social welfare. In the Shy and Stenbacka model, privacy means the 
impossibility for firms to use data about users’ preferences to engage in price discrimination 
strategies; on the contrary, the market is characterized by no privacy protection if firms can 
freely use customers data and price discriminate. Overall, the two authors find that without 
privacy protection firms are better off than with strong privacy protection but also that some 
degree of protection is desirable for the firms. Moreover, they show that the consumer surplus 
and the total welfare increase with the level of privacy protection, and they refer to this 
property as “monotonicity”.  
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3.1 The model 
 
Following the setup of the Shy and Stenbacka model, we will assume that: 
- There are three companies: an upstream data-broker and two downstream companies 
(A and B). The two downstream firms compete producing differentiated products or 
services labeled as A and B. 
- There are 2n consumers: n consumers are A-oriented (i.e. they have a preference for 
A) and n consumers are B-oriented (i.e. prefer B over A, prices equal). Formally, A-
oriented customers evaluate 𝑣ℎ product A and 𝑣𝑙 product B, with 𝑣ℎ > 𝑣𝑙 , for B-
oriented customers the opposite applies.   
- Consumers in the previous period (t0) bought from one of the two firms, and in the 
current period (t1) they have to decide whether to confirm their purchase decision or 
not.  
- In t0, a portion (1 − µ) of customers has purchased their preferred company; these 
customers are named as “matched” customers. Clearly, a portion µ is “mismatched” 
that is customers who have purchased the least preferred product. All throughout the 
paper, we assume that 0 < µ < 1/2.  
- Consumers who decide to change product have to bear a switching cost, s. In addition, 
the parameter σ, where 𝜎 > 0, measures the heterogeneity of switching costs: high 
values of σ generate a greater differentiation of switching costs among all buyers with 
s ∈ [0, 1]. 
 
The timing is as follows: in the first stage, the data-broker offers its data to the two 
downstream firms (it sets the price of the data, that we indicate with t), and in the second 
stage firms decide whether to buy the data or not and then compete; access to the data allows 
a firm to price discriminate customers. The model is solved by backward induction. 
In addition to collecting more and more data, companies also have an interest in buying data 
from data-brokers. The purchase of data packages allows them to have a detailed profiling of 
consumers: the more data they have, the more accurate the information on consumers (current 
and potential) will be, the more they will be able to easily implement targeted strategies 
(especially targeted advertising and price discrimination) and the more they will be able to 
play a dominant role in the reference industry. 
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3.1.1 The last stage: the downstream firms 
 
In the last stage of the game, there are three possible scenarios: 
1. Both firms have purchased data from the data-broker; 
2. None of the companies has purchased data from the data-broker; 
3. Only one of the two firms (be it A or B) has purchased the data from the data-broker. 
These three scenarios differ from the amount of information each firm has access to. As 
explained above, when one firm buys the data is able to discriminate not only between 
matched and mismatched customers, but also to discriminate against customers in relation to 
their previous purchase decision. 
In what follows, we analyze and identify the equilibrium (i.e. optimal prices) for each of 
these possible scenarios. 
 
1. Both companies do acquire data (i.e. “no privacy” regime) 
When both firms do acquire and use data (we refer to this as the “no privacy” 
scenario), firms have both the same and highest amount possible of information about 
customers; specifically, the data allow firms to ascertain which customers have purchased 
their preferred products in stage t0 and from which firm. In this case they can charge up to 
four different prices: 
1. A price for the matched customers of the firms that have bought their preferred 
product, 𝑝𝑖ℎ (with 𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵); 
2. A price for the matched customers of the company that have bought from the rival 
company, 𝑝𝑖𝑙;  
3. A price for the mismatched customers that have bought from the company they prefer, 
𝑞𝑖ℎ;  
4. A price for the mismatched customers that have bought from the company that prefer 
the less, 𝑞𝑖𝑙. 
In this way, companies can price discriminate customers according to their type (i.e. i-
oriented or j-oriented) and according to their past purchases (i.e. previous purchase). 
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𝑣ℎ − 𝑝𝑖ℎ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖 − 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝑏𝑢𝑦⁡𝑖
𝑣𝑙 − 𝑝𝑖𝑙⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑗 − 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝑏𝑢𝑦⁡𝑖
𝑣𝑙 − 𝑞𝑗𝑙 − 𝑠𝜎⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑖 − 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝑗
𝑣ℎ − 𝑞𝑗ℎ − 𝑠𝜎⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑗 − 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝑗
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(1) 
 
where 𝑠 (with 0 < 𝑠 < 1) indicates the cost of switching brand and σ (σ > 0) measures the 
heterogeneity of switching costs, and where vh is the higher valuation and vl is the lower 
valuation with 𝑣ℎ > 𝑣𝑙 > 0. 
Note that for a customer having a preference for a company i (i.e. A or B), switching 
to competition j (i.e. the other company) can be particularly onerous, because the customer 
has a preference for the company i and moreover he has to sustain switching costs 𝑠.  
Switching costs are particularly important in the model, either for matched and 
mismatched customers. If we consider the correctly matched customers of company i, some 
of them switch to competition j: in fact there might be customers that despite having a 
preference for company i may decide to switch to company j. This can happen, for example, 
because company j offers an advantageous price: in this case, those that have a really low 
switching cost can decide to switch, while those that have a high switching cost do not switch 
and remain with their preferred company. 
How many customers switch brand and how many do not switch? In order to answer 
these questions we need to find, both for the matched and for the unmatched users, the 
indifferent customer, indifferent between switching and not switching. 
For “matched” customers, i.e. i-oriented customers (where i is A or B) that have a 
preference for company 𝑖, this means finding the level of 𝑠 that solves the condition 𝑣ℎ −
𝑝𝑖ℎ = v𝑙 − 𝑞𝑗𝑙 − 𝑠σ: all of the customers that have a switching cost higher than this value, 
that we indicate with 𝑠𝑖ℎ, remain loyal to company i, while the others switch to competition, 
j. For “mismatched” customers, i.e. the customers that has a preference for company i but that 
have previously bought from company j, this means finding the s by solving 𝑣𝑙 − 𝑝𝑖𝑙 = vℎ −






As in the model of Shy and Stenbacka, we define the difference in individual evaluations, 
Δ = 𝑣ℎ − 𝑣𝑙where the higher valuation is vh and the lower valuation is vl, with Δindicating 
the utility loss (gain) associated with a customer mismatch (match). 
From the indifferent conditions, the threshold levels of the switching costs are defined as: 
 
𝑠𝑎ℎ =
𝑝𝑎ℎ − 𝑞𝑏𝑙 − Δ
σ
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑠𝑎𝑙 =




𝑝𝑏ℎ − 𝑞𝑎𝑙 − Δ
σ
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑠𝑏𝑙 =




Firms can set four different prices to maximize their profits, that for A and B respectively,can 
described as: 
 
𝜋𝐴 = 𝑝𝑎ℎ(1 − 𝑠𝑎ℎ)(1 − µ)𝑛 + 𝑝𝑎𝑙(1 − 𝑠𝑎𝑙)µ𝑛 + 𝑞𝑎ℎ𝑠𝑏𝑙µ𝑛 + 𝑞𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑏ℎ(1 − µ)𝑛 − 𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(4) 
𝜋𝐵 = 𝑝𝑏ℎ(1 − 𝑠𝑏ℎ)(1 − µ)𝑛 + 𝑝𝑏𝑙(1 − 𝑠𝑏𝑙)µ𝑛 + 𝑞𝑏ℎ𝑠𝑎𝑙µ𝑛 + 𝑞𝑏𝑙𝑠𝑎ℎ(1 − µ)𝑛 − 𝑡⁡⁡⁡(5) 
 
In these two functions, the first two terms are related to the portion of “loyal” customers, i.e. 
customers that keep buying from the same firm: (1 − 𝑠𝑖ℎ)(1 − µ) represents the proportion 
of matched customers that remains loyal, while the proportion (1 − 𝑠𝑖𝑗)µ represents the 
proportion of mismatched customers that remain loyal. The last two elements represent 
matched and mismatched “non-loyal” customers. Finally, as we are in the scenario 
characterized by both firms buying the data, the profit functions include the cost of 
purchasing the data from the upstream data-broker 𝑡: if a firm does acquire data it pays the 
cost, vice versa it does not. For now, the value of t is considered as an exogenous cost; while 
subsequently, the cost t will become an endogenous variable. 
Substituting (2) and (3) into the profit functions in (4) and (5) and then maximizing profits, it 
is possible to obtain the profit maximizing prices charged by the two firms in this subgame: 
 
𝑝𝑎ℎ = 𝑝𝑏ℎ =
2σ + Δ
3
;⁡𝑝𝑎𝑙 = 𝑝𝑏𝑙 =
2σ − Δ
3










The switching costs threshold are obtained by substituting (6) into (2) and (3): 
 














Where s1is the equilibrium threshold for the correctly matched customers (1 − µ), and s2 is 
the equilibrium threshold for the mismatched customers µ, where (𝑎, 𝑎) indicates that we are 
in the subgame where both firms use the data to price discriminate (i.e. “no privacy” regime).  
Finally, substituting the prices found in (6) and the two switching cost thresholds (7) into (4) 
and (5) we have that if both downstream firms acquire data from the upstream data-brokers, 
the profits for the two firms A and B are: 
 
𝜋𝑖(𝑎, 𝑎) =
𝑛[5σ2 + 2σ(1 − 2µ)Δ + 2Δ2]
9σ
− 𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∀𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(8) 
 
When the two downstream firms do acquire data from the upstream data-broker, their profits 
are affected by the difference between the higher and the lower valuation (Δ), by the 
heterogeneity of the switching costs (σ) and by the proportion of mismatched customers (µ). 
 
2. None of the companies acquire data from the upstream data-broker (i.e. “privacy” regime) 
If none of the two companies do acquire data, we are in the (𝑛, 𝑛) subgame (“privacy” 
regime). This means that, differently from the previous scenario, companies have less 
information about customers. Following Shy and Stenbacka, we assume that in this case, 
companies can only identify their own previous customers; therefore they end up setting two 
prices: one for the customers that have previously bought, that we indicate with p, and one for 
those customers that have previously bought from competition, q. Moreover, the fact that 
firms do not have access to the data provided by the data-broker also means that, differently 
from before, each company is unable to distinguish between matched and mismatched 
customers. 
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Substituting 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑝𝑏 = 𝑝and𝑞𝑎 = 𝑞𝑏 = 𝑞 into the utility function (1) and into the profit 
functions (4) and (5), and then maximizing for the values of 𝑝 and 𝑞 it is possible to obtain 
the equilibrium prices in the subgame: 
 
𝑝𝑎 = 𝑝𝑏 = 𝑝 =
2σ + (1 − 2µ)Δ
3
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑞𝑎 = 𝑞𝑏 = 𝑞 =




















Substituting (9) and (10) into (4) and (5), the amount of profits obtained by the two firms are: 
 
𝜋𝑖(𝑛, 𝑛) =
𝑛[5σ2 + 2σ(1 − 2µ)Δ + 2Δ2(1 − 2µ)2]
9σ
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∀⁡𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(11) 
 
Clearly, differently from the previous case, in this case the equilibrium profits do not depend 
on 𝑡, as both firms do not buy the data from the data-broker. 
 
3. One of the two firms (be it A or B) does acquire data, while the other does not (i.e. “mixed 
regime) 
The third scenario is the one in which one company (be it A or B) acquires data and 
the other does not. The following discussion will assume that company A acquires data and B 
does not (𝑎, 𝑛); however, since the model is symmetric, the reasoning is the same for the case 
in which B does acquire data and A does not (𝑛, 𝑎). 
If company A acquires data it can set four different prices (as in the case of “no privacy”), 
while company B, that does not acquire data, can set “only” two prices (as in the case of 
“privacy”). Therefore we end up respectively with (𝑎)for company A and (𝑛)for company B, 
which means a case of (𝑎, 𝑛). 
Formally, the utility function of the generic customer 𝑐 having a relationship respectively 
with A and B becomes: 
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𝑈𝐴(𝑐){
𝑣ℎ − 𝑝𝑎ℎ⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐴 − 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝑏𝑢𝑦⁡𝐴
𝑣𝑙 − 𝑝𝑎𝑙⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐵 − 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝑏𝑢𝑦⁡𝐴
𝑣𝑙 − 𝑞𝑏 − 𝑠𝜎⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐴 − 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝐵




𝑣ℎ − 𝑝𝑏⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐵 − 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝑏𝑢𝑦⁡𝐵
𝑣𝑙 − 𝑝𝑏⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐴 − 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝑏𝑢𝑦⁡𝐵
𝑣𝑙 − 𝑞𝑎𝑙 − 𝑠𝜎⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐵 − 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝐴
𝑣ℎ − 𝑞𝑎ℎ − 𝑠𝜎⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐴 − 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑠⁡𝑡𝑜⁡𝐴
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(13) 
 
From the indifferent conditions, the threshold levels of the switching costs are defined as: 
 
𝑠𝑎ℎ =
𝑝𝑎ℎ − 𝑞𝑏 − Δ
σ
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑠𝑎𝑙 =




𝑝𝑏 − 𝑞𝑎𝑙 − Δ
σ
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑠𝑏𝑙 =




The two companies want to maximize the profit functions, respectively for company A and 
B, described as: 
 
𝜋𝐴 = 𝑝𝑎ℎ(1 − 𝑠𝑎ℎ)(1 − µ)𝑛 + 𝑝𝑎𝑙(1 − 𝑠𝑎𝑙)µ𝑛 + 𝑞𝑎ℎ𝑠𝑏𝑙µ𝑛 + 𝑞𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑏ℎ(1 − µ)𝑛 − 𝑡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(16) 
𝜋𝐵 = 𝑝𝑏(1 − 𝑠𝑏ℎ)(1 − µ)𝑛 + 𝑝𝑏(1 − 𝑠𝑏𝑙)µ𝑛 + 𝑞𝑏𝑠𝑎𝑙µ𝑛 + 𝑞𝑏𝑠𝑎ℎ(1 − µ)𝑛⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(17) 
 
In this case, since only one company acquires data, only company A incurs the cost of 
acquiring data, 𝑡. 
Substituting (14) and (15) into the profit functions in (16) and (17) and then maximizing 
profits, it is possible to obtain the profit maximizing prices charged by the two firms: 
 
𝑝𝑎ℎ =
2σ + (1 + µ)Δ
3
;⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑝𝑎𝑙 =
2σ − (1 − µ)Δ
3
;⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑞𝑎ℎ =








2σ + (1 − 2µ)Δ
3
⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑎𝑛𝑑⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑞𝑏 =





















The model of Shy and Stenbacka assumes that the switching cost thresholds are in between 0 
and 1, therefore the two values s1 and s2exist in this range. For these values, the model exists 
and there is an internal solution.  
Finally, substituting the prices found in (18) and the two switching cost thresholds (19) into 
(16) and (17) we have that if A does acquire data from the upstream data-broker, while B 
does not, the profits for the two firms A and B are: 
 
𝜋𝐴(𝑎, 𝑛) =








Clearly, given the symmetry of the model, we have that 𝜋𝐴(𝑛, 𝑎) = 𝜋𝐵(𝑎, 𝑛) and 𝜋𝐵(𝑛, 𝑎) =
𝜋𝐴(𝑎, 𝑛). 
 
Data or not? Finding the Nash Equilibrium in the firms’ choice 
The above profits represent the pay-offs firms enjoy in the various possible scenarios 
regarding the acquisition of data from the data-broker, given the price 𝑡. We are now in the 
position to determine the equilibrium of the game played by the two firms who 
simultaneously decide about data acquisition. 







Acquire 𝜋𝐴(𝑎, 𝑎); 𝜋𝐵(𝑎, 𝑎) 𝜋𝐴(𝑎, 𝑛); 𝜋𝐵(𝑎, 𝑛) 










with𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵,  
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Both companies acquire the data is a Nash equilibrium if: 
 
𝜋𝑖(𝑎, 𝑎) ≥ ⁡𝜋𝑖(𝑎, 𝑛)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∀⁡𝑖⁡ = 𝐴, 𝐵 
 








Alternatively, (𝑛, 𝑛)is Nash equilibrium if: 
 
𝜋𝑖(𝑛, 𝑛) ≥ ⁡𝜋𝑖(𝑎, 𝑛)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∀⁡𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵 
 
Using the expressions (9) and (12),(𝑛, 𝑛) is Nash equilibrium if 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡2where𝑡2 =
2nΔ2µ(1−µ)
σ
,with𝑡2 > 𝑡1. 
Finally, using expressions (8), (11) and (20), it is easy to check that (𝑎, 𝑛) or(𝑛, 𝑎) are the 
equilibria if 𝑡1 < 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡2. Therefore, for the area 𝑡1 < 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡2, the Nash equilibrium is when 
one company (be it A or B) does acquire data while the other does not.  
 
Result 1: Given the price of the data, t, the equilibrium in the second stage game is (𝑎, 𝑎) if 











The two thresholds 𝑡1and 𝑡2 are both increasing in µ; graphically in a (µ, 𝑡) space, the 





This diagram identifies the Nash Equilibria of the model. When the price of the data is very 
large, 𝑡 > 𝑡2 both firms do not acquire and (𝑛, 𝑛) is a Nash equilibrium; alternatively, when 
the price is low, 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1 both firms do acquire data and in this case (𝑎, 𝑎) is a Nash 
Equilibrium. If 𝑡 takes intermediate values, 𝑡1 < 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡2, the equilibrium is the mixed one, 
whereby only one firm purchases the data. 
The diagram reveals that the area with the mixed equilibrium gets smaller the lower the 
fraction 𝜇 of mismatched customers. Interestingly, if we make the difference between 𝑡1 and 
𝑡2: 







It is possible to see that, given µ, the area with the mixed equilibrium gets larger the larger Δ 
and the smaller σ.  
3.1.2 The first stage: The data-broker 
 
 Going backward, we can define the equilibrium in the first stage, where the upstream 
data-broker decides the price of data, 𝑡.  
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The data-broker decides the price that guarantees him the greatest profit; there are two 
alternatives:  
a) 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1; in this case we know that both firms purchase the data; the highest price the 







b) 𝑡1 < 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡2 with only one firm buying the data; in this case the highest price that the 




Since 𝑡2 > 2 ⋅ 𝑡1, the second option is preferred by the data-broker and in equilibrium the 
data are sold only to one company.  
Result 2: The subgame perfect equilibrium of the two stage game is characterized by the data 
broker setting 𝑡2 =
2𝑛𝛥2µ(1−µ)
𝜎
 and only one firm purchasing the data. 
Interestingly, this is the same equilibrium that the data-broker would obtain if it offered an 
exclusivity agreement on data to only one of the two downstream firms. However, the data-
broker does not explicitly discriminate or offer the exclusivity when it sells its data as 
happens for instance in the model of Clavorà Braulin and Valletti (2016), but it is the 
downstream market itself that when the price for data is 𝑡2, selects the equilibrium 
characterized by only one firm purchasing the data. 
3.1.3 Welfare Analysis 
 
After analyzing the equilibrium of our vertically integrated market, one might wonder what 
the socially optimal configuration of the market is. We answer this question by analyzing 
consumer surplus, producer surplus (considering the price for data, 𝑡, which also affects the 
profits of the data-broker), and total welfare (i.e. the sum of consumer surplus and industry 
profits) in the three possible cases that may arise: 
- Case 1 - Both companies acquire data (𝑎, 𝑎) at the price of 𝑡1; 
- Case 2 - Only one company acquires data (𝑎, 𝑛) or (𝑛, 𝑎) at the price of 𝑡2. 
- Case 3 – No one purchases the data (𝑛, 𝑛). 
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Case 1 - Both companies acquire (a,a) 
In this scenario both companies acquire data from the upstream data-brokers at 𝑡1. 
Theconsumer surplusis the sum of individuals’ net surpluses; formally: 
 
𝐶𝑆𝑖 = (1 − µ)𝑛∫ (
1
𝑠1
𝑣ℎ − 𝑝𝑖ℎ)𝑑𝑠⁡ +⁡(1 − µ)𝑛∫ (𝑣l − 𝑞𝑗ℎ − 𝑠𝜎
𝑠1
0







𝑣ℎ − 𝑞𝑗ℎ − 𝑠𝜎)𝑑𝑠⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡with⁡𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(21) 
 
where the first two terms indicate the surplusesof matched customers: the first term 
represents the surplus of i-oriented customers which continue to buy from i, the second term 
represents the surplus i-oriented customers that switch to j. Similar interpretations for the 
third and fourth term for the portion of mismatched customers, µ. 
Substituting the equilibrium prices in (6) and the corresponding switching cost thresholds (7) 
into (21) for A and B yields aggregate consumer surplus: 
 
𝐶𝑆(𝑎, 𝑎) = 𝐶𝑆𝐴(𝑎, 𝑎) + 𝐶𝑆𝐵(𝑎, 𝑎) =
𝑛
9σ
{Δ2 − 11σ2 + 2σ[𝑣ℎ(5 − µ) + 𝑣𝑙(4 + µ)}⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(22) 
 
In this case, the consumer surplus decreases with µ, the proportion of mismatched customers. 
When both firms acquire data, the profit function for each company is the same as in (8), with 





{5σ2 + 2σ(1 − 2µ)Δ + 2Δ2(1 − 2µ)2)}⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡∀⁡𝑖 = 𝐴, 𝐵⁡⁡⁡⁡(23) 
 










The producer surplus (𝑃𝑠) for the case of are the sum of the profit of the data-broker (24) plus 






{5σ2 + 2σ(1 − 2µ)Δ + 2Δ2}⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(25) 
 
Total welfare is described as the sum of the total consumer surplus in (22) plus the producer 





{5Δ2 − σ2 + 2σ[𝑣ℎ(7 − 5µ) + 𝑣𝑙(2 + 5µ)]}⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(26) 
 
Case 2 - “Mixed case” (a,n) or (n,a) 
Now we analyze the case in which one company acquires data and the other doesnot. We 
consider the case in which A acquires and B does not acquire (𝑎, 𝑛), but the same is true for 
the opposite case, (𝑛, 𝑎). 
Total consumer surplus, i.e. the sum of the two consumer surplus for company A and B is 
defined by substituting the equilibrium prices in (18) and the corresponding switching cost 
thresholds (19) into (21), which yields to: 
 
𝐶𝑆(𝑎, 𝑛) = 𝐶𝑆𝐴(𝑎, 𝑛) + 𝐶𝑆𝐵(𝑎, 𝑛) =
𝑛
9σ
{(1 + 5µ − 5µ2)Δ2 − 11σ2 + 2σ[𝑣ℎ(5 − µ) + 𝑣𝑙(µ + 4)}⁡⁡(27) 
 
In this case the upstream data-broker is selling to only one firm at t2. Therefore, the profits 
are the same as in (20) but for the company acquiring data (in this case company A) we have 
that 𝑡 = 𝑡2 =
2nΔ2µ(1−µ)
σ









{5σ2 + 2σ(1 − 2µ)Δ + 2Δ2(1 − 2µ)2}⁡⁡(28) 
 
The two firms make different gross profits and in fact the firm that buys the data (in this case 
A) makes higher gross profits than the company that does not acquire (in this case B). 
However, since firm A buys the data it has to pay the price 𝑡2, the data-broker is able to 
extract entirely as much surplus as it can. For this reason, the final result is that in equilibrium 
the net profits of the two firms in the asymmetric case are the same. 






     (29) 
 
Producer surplus (𝑃𝑠) is described as the sum of the two downstream firms’ profits found in 





{5σ2 + 2σ(1 − 2µ)Δ + Δ2[2 + µ(1 − µ)]}⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(30) 
 
Total welfare is therefore defined by summing the producer surplus found in (30), and total 





{(5 + 7µ − 7µ2)Δ2 − σ2 + 2σ[𝑣ℎ(5µ − 7) + 𝑣𝑙(5µ + 2)]}⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(31) 
 
Case 3- None of the companies acquire data (n,n) 
Suppose that the data broker sets 𝑡 > 𝑡2; in this case, no firm purchases the data. 
Alternatively, one may think to the case in which there is no upstream data-broker selling its 
data to the two downstream firms. 
Total consumer surplus is defined by substituting the equilibrium prices in (9) and the 
corresponding switching cost thresholds (10) into (21), which yields to aggregate consumer 
surplus.Formally: 
 
𝐶𝑆(𝑛, 𝑛) = 𝐶𝑆𝐴(𝑛, 𝑛) + 𝐶𝑆𝐵(𝑛, 𝑛) =
𝑛
9σ
{(1 + 32µ − 32µ2)Δ2 − 11σ2 + 2σ[𝑣ℎ(5 − µ) + 𝑣𝑙(µ + 4)}⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(32) 
 
For the case of (𝑛, 𝑛), since both firms do not acquire data, the upstream market of the data-
broker and its related profits are not considered. Therefore, producer surplus equals the sum 





{5σ2 + 2σ(1 − 2µ)Δ + 2Δ2(1 − 2µ)2}⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(33) 
 
The total welfare is described as the sum of the total consumer surplus in (32) and the profits 






{(5 + 16µ − 16µ2)Δ2 − σ2 + 2σ[𝑣ℎ(7 − 5µ) + 𝑣𝑙(5µ + 2)}⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(34) 
 
3.2 Results comparison 
 
Producer surplus 
Producer surplus (𝑃𝑠) is described as the sum of the profits of the two downstream firms plus, 
eventually, the profits of the data-broker. 
Formally, the difference between the producer surpluses in the three different cases is: 
 

















As 0 < µ <
1
2
, we have that 𝑃𝑠(𝑛, 𝑛) < 𝑃𝑠(𝑎, 𝑎) < 𝑃𝑠(𝑎, 𝑛). Therefore the following result 
holds: 
 
Result 3: The producer surplus is larger when one firm (either A or B) does acquire data and 
the other does not, (𝑎, 𝑛) or (𝑛, 𝑎), with the upstream data-broker making a profit equal to 
𝑡2.  
 
In addition, the difference between the producer surpluses in the three cases is increasing as a 
function of µ, i.e. the fraction of mismatched customers: as the fraction of mismatched 
customers (µ) increases, the benefit of a firm to have knowledge of customers’ preferences 
increases as well.  
 
Consumer surplus 
Formally, the difference between the consumer surpluses (𝐶𝑆) of the three different cases is: 
 


















Therefore, we have that 𝐶𝑆(𝑎, 𝑎) < 𝐶𝑆(𝑎, 𝑛) < 𝐶𝑆(𝑛, 𝑛). As before, the difference between 
the consumer surplus of the three different cases is increasing as a function of µ, the portion 
of mismatched customers. 
 
Result 4: The consumer surplus increases with the level of privacy protection. 
 
This results reflects the “monotonicity” property already described in Shy and Stenbacka: 
therefore, consumer surplus is higher when both firms do not acquire data. The less privacy 
protection, the higher the amount of information at firms’ disposal, the higher the possibility 
for firms to set a higher number of different prices, the lower the consumer surplus. The fact 
that firms can price-condition customers based on their brand preferences is not beneficial for 




The total welfare (𝑊) is described as the sum of total consumer surplus (𝐶𝑆) and producer 
surplus (𝑃𝑠). Formally the total welfare differences between the three cases are defined as: 
 

















Since0 < µ <
1
2
, we have that 𝑊(𝑎, 𝑎) < 𝑊(𝑎, 𝑛) < 𝑊(𝑛, 𝑛). In fact, we register the lower 
total welfare in the case of (𝑎, 𝑎), when both firms acquire data about customers from the 
upstream data-broker; while the higher level of total welfare is represented by the case of 
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(𝑛, 𝑛), when none of the firms acquire data. As for the consumer surplus (𝐶𝑆),also the total 
welfare (𝑊) reveals the “monotonicity” property, and the following result holds: 
 
Result 5: Total welfare increases with the level of privacy protection. 
 
Therefore, the more information companies possess about customers and the easier it is for 
them to discriminate against consumers on the basis of their preferences. The less a firm 
knows about customers, the lower its possibility to price discriminate and the higher the total 
welfare. This means that the enhancement of privacy policies aiming at reducing the 
possibility for firms to discriminate on the basis of customers’ preferences ends up increasing 
the total welfare.  
 
In conclusion, the consumer surplus and the total welfare increase with the level of privacy 
protection (i.e. “monotonicity”). On the contrary, the producer surplusdo not follow the 
“monotonicity” property, because it shows higher results for the “mixed” regime, when only 
one company (be it A or B) acquires the data and not in the case where the level of privacy 
protection of customers is higher. 
 
From this discussion, we end up with the following Corollary describing the social optimum: 
 
Final Corollary:  
A. The socially optimal outcome is (𝑛, 𝑛). This means that the best possible outcome 
form the social perspective is the one in which there is not upstream data-broker 
(absence of data market); companies do not buy any data and cannot discriminate; 
B. The second best is the “mixed” regime,(𝑎, 𝑛) or (𝑛, 𝑎), which is actually the market 
equilibrium where the data-broker offers its data at 𝑡2 and only one company (be it A 
or B) purchases it. 
 
3.3 Extension of the model: the dual-approach 
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We analyzed the setting that includes an upstream data broker who sells its data to two 
downstream firms. What if the data broker and one of the two downstream companies are 
vertically integrated?  
This setting is particularly interesting when looking at real world digital markets which are 
dominated by tech giants, such as Amazon. Amazon follows a so-called “dual approach”: it 
controls the platform where transactions take place and, in many cases, competes with other 
vendors in the retail market. The issue of our interest is that being the operator of the 
platform, Amazon has access to all the relevant information about the transactions taking 
place on the platform, also those regarding its rivals in the retail market. Amazon knows the 
identity of rivals' customers, it observes transaction prices, it knows about sellers and their 
commercial strategies and so on. This feature of platform markets has attracted the attention 
of regulators and policy makers as significantly contributes to maintain the parket power of 
dominant operators. 
We can use our model to try to represent this situation, by assuming that one of the two 
vendors has also access to the data, that is it is vertically integrated backwards and controls 
the data-broker. In this scenario, the vertically integrated operator can decide whether or not 
to sell the data to the rival firm with which it competes in the retail market. The question then 
is the following: is this firm willing to sell its data to the rival? And is the rival willing to 
purchase such data? 
Suppose company A (e.g. Amazon) controls the data, while B is the rival in the retail market. 
A collects its data but it does not pay the price to get the data. Using our previous notation, if 
firm A does not sell the data to B it gets 𝜋𝐴(𝑎, 𝑛), gross of t that in this case it does not pay as 
it controls the data, while if it sells the data to B it gets 𝜋𝐴(𝑎, 𝑎). Hence, A has an incentive to 
sell its data to B if and only if the price it receives from the sale of the data more than 
compensates the smaller profits: 
 
𝑡 > 𝜋𝐴(𝑎, 𝑛) − 𝜋𝐴(𝑎, 𝑎) 
 
On the other hand, if firm B purchases the data it gets 𝜋𝐵(𝑎, 𝑎), gross of the payment, while it 
gets 𝜋𝐵(𝑎, 𝑛) if it does not acquire the data. Hence, firm B purchases the data from A if and 
only if the payment is not too large: 
 
𝑡 < 𝜋𝐵(𝑎, 𝑎) − 𝜋𝐵(𝑎, 𝑛) 
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Therefore, A sells the data and B buys them if and only if: 
 
𝜋𝐴(𝑎, 𝑛) − 𝜋𝐴(𝑎, 𝑎) < 𝑡 < 𝜋𝐵(𝑎, 𝑎) − 𝜋𝐵(𝑎, 𝑛) 
 
Hence, there is room for the sale of the data only if: 
 
𝜋𝐴(𝑎, 𝑛) − 𝜋𝐴(𝑎, 𝑎) < 𝜋𝐵(𝑎, 𝑎) − 𝜋𝐵(𝑎, 𝑛) 
 
that is if (remember, the model is symmetric therefore, 𝜋𝐴(𝑎, 𝑎) = 𝜋𝐵(𝑎, 𝑎)): 
 
2𝜋𝐴(𝑎, 𝑎) − [𝜋𝐵(𝑎, 𝑛) + 𝜋𝑎(𝑎, 𝑛)] > 0 
 





> 0⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ⁡0 < 𝜇 < 1/2 
 
Which is clearly impossible. Hence the following result: 
 
Result 6: It does not exist a price for the data that A is willing to accept and that  B is willing 
to pay. 
 
With all the limitation of our simple model, this extension reveals that a vertically integrated 
firm which acts both as a data-broker and compete in the retail market has not incentive to 
sell its data to the rival firm. 
Today, few digital platforms cover a central role in specific segments (e.g. Amazon, 
Facebook, Google, Booking, etc) and keep maintaining a dominant position in the market of 
reference also thanks to the possession of valuable information about customers. With this 
data, companies can more accurately assess their willingness to pay and more easily set 
differentiated prices or personalized services which ultimately make consumers more willing 
to make the purchase. Therefore, there are some companies that occupy a more strategic 
position in their reference market. According to our model, these companies do not sell the 
data, rather they prefer to keep it for themselves. Our model is static, so a dynamic extension 
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of the model would ensure that the market continues to remain in a condition of dominance 
by the firm that controls the data. However, in recent years, regulators are pushing to limit the 
competitiveness of these giants, enacting legislation in favor of a limitation of their market 
power, favoring lower barriers to entry and higher competitiveness. And this is happening 
both at the European and at the international level. For instance, in December 2020, a 
regulation proposal called "Digital Markets Act" was presented with the main idea of putting 
order to the digital market, mainly from an antitrust point of view, and numerous antitrust 




This paper deals with issues regarding the economics of privacy, which analyses “the 
trade-offs associated with the balancing of public and private spheres between individuals, 
organizations, and governments” (Acquisti et al., 2016).  
Privacy is a complex and malleable concept. It can be identified both as the need to 
isolate oneself from others by taking refuge in one's "private sphere", as well as the need of 
"hiding information" (Posner, 1978). Dealing with a “data-subject”, privacy involves also the 
identification of some "property rights" (Stigler, 1980). Subsequently, towards the end of the 
90s, with the digitization of information and the reduction of marginal costs of collection and 
storage of data and information (Shapiro and Varian, 1998), economists have studied the 
consequences from the transfer and exchange of data: positive and negative externalities 
(Varian, 1997), the issue of transaction costs, assignment of ownership and control rights 
(Noam, 1997; Laudon, 1997). With the advent of cutting-edge and increasingly sophisticated 
information technologies, the economics of privacy has developed in its different 
ramifications, increasing its complexity. However, in light of the possibility for companies to 
more easily identify consumers, as well as their characteristics, behavior or "clickstream", the 
issue of privacy violation has been studied considering the "informational privacy" 
(Brandimarte and Acquisti, 2012) and the related "information security". 
Are consumers worried about their privacy? On the one hand, it can be argued that 
consumers receive personalized and enhanced offers: they can obtain a benefit given by an 
offer that is more relevant to them, which reduces their search costs and increases their 
welfare (Acquisti et al. 2016). However, the possibility of easily identifying consumers has 
exposed them to risky practices such as price discrimination, target advertising and 
personalization, but also identity theft and the aforementioned privacy violations. In deciding 
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their level of privacy protection, individuals face the so-called “privacy paradox”: they claim 
to be concerned and willing to protect their privacy, but they end up giving up privacy when 
they are incentivized to do so (Athey et al. 2017). 
Profiles of customers are constantly updated on the basis of new information 
companies can collect both directly and indirectly from data-brokers. Moreover, companies 
are also helped by data-brokers. Data-brokers are described as "companies that collect 
consumers' personal information and resell or share that information with others" (Federal 
Trade Commission, 2014). These companies can be of various types: financial data providers 
such as Bloomberg, credit rating agencies such as Moody's, "pure" data brokers such as 
Acxiom and online aggregators such as Spokeo (Bergemann and Bonatti, 2012). Data-
brokers play a strategic role concerning the collecting, managing, organizing and selling data 
products or packages, but these practices usually happen in consumer non-awareness and 
customers end up supporting the major risks. This is why the legislation has intervened in 
order to put some limitations on how data should be managed by intermediaries, third-parties 
and retailers through regulation such as the European GDPR.  
In the third chapter we presented a model with a data-broker, analyzing its strategic 
role as suppliers of worthful data and information to two downstream firms. Starting from the 
model of Shy and Stenbacka (2016), we have considered two downstream firms that have to 
decide if to acquire or not the data from an upstream data-broker: buying data means 
supporting a cost 𝑡, which also is crucial in determining the profits for the data-broker. 
This model is solved by backward induction: in the last stage companies have to 
simultaneously decide if to acquire (supporting the cost) or not acquire (avoiding the cost) the 
data. After having analyzed the decision made by downstream firms, by backward induction 
we analyze the upstream data-broker operating in the data-market and deciding the price for 
its data. Our model reveals that, in equilibrium, the data-broker sells its data to only one firm 
at a larger price. In the last phase of our analysis we perform a welfare and we show that 
despite total producer surplus being higher for the “mixed” regime (where one of the 
companies acquires data), consumer surplus and total welfare are larger in the privacy regime 
(where none of the companies acquire data). The “first best” of the model is therefore the 
scenario where there is no upstream data market and none of the firms acquire data 
(“privacy” regime), and the “second best” is the “mixed” regime, i.e. when only one of the 
two downstream firms (be it A or B) acquires data from the upstream data-broker. Despite the 
limitations of the model, we can comment on its interesting results. 
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 In the model, we have shown that the price for data set by the upstream data-broker 𝑡 
significantly affects the equilibrium at the firms’ level. In fact, according to the price for data 
chosen by the data-brokers, each of the two downstream firms can buy or not the data, but 
this does not mean that the data-broker is offering the exclusivity to only one firm. On the 
contrary, it is the market itself that determines this outcome. 
As a "second-best" result, the model predicts that in equilibrium only one firm (be it 
A or B) acquires the data while the other does not. In reality, what we actually observe is that 
data ownership is not widespread among all the companies on the market, rather a few 
companies control huge amounts of data. Our model is static, therefore a potential extension 
of the model could be the dynamic version of the model, considering for instance that the 
firm acquiring the data in the long-run could exclude the rival from the market. Therefore, it 
can be assumed that a policy intervention could be aimed at imposing the sale of data to all 
downstream companies, in order to put them all on the same level, thus preventing a tendency 
to monopolization. 
A comment can be done also considering the “first best” outcome, which corresponds 
to the case where none of the companies do acquire data from the data-broker. From a social 
welfare perspective, this result suggests that it would make sense to promote the maximum 
level of privacy protection, even if this means the closing of the data-market. Actually, for 
consumers, this corresponds to the scenario that provides them with a higher level of data 
protection. This conclusion suggests that privacy policies should aim at ensuring higher 
consumer surplus, which in our model is increasing with the level of privacy protection. This 
result embraces the idea that in the age of digitization there is a need to push for greater 
privacy protection, especially for what concerns customers and online users, which usually 
are the most vulnerable. Even with the limitations of the model, this result supports the idea 
of the current policies, regulations and laws aimed at granting the consumer a greater level of 
data protection, such as the European GDPR or the California Consumer Privacy Act. 
Overall, our results are in line with the idea of creating a “global consensus on 
privacy” by standardizing global and international laws aimed at protecting more customers 
and at the same time favoring the competition between firms while downsizing the 
monopolist positions held by few players in specific markets. For example, the European 
GDPR has found counterparts such as the Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados (LGPD) in Brazil 
and the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) in California that both entered into force in 
2020. However, it must also be considered the dynamic nature of the legislation that could 
have influences in the years to come, not only on consumer protection, but also from the 
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point of view of the data collection by companies, ultimately leading to significant changes in 
the data market. 
There are still many open questions in the field of the economics of privacy. The first 
question is linked to the definition of the cost of privacy intrusions, i.e. the harmful 
consequences from the disclosure of personal information, which can be treated both from an 
economic (i.e. quantitative) approach, and from a psychological (i.e. abstract) approach. The 
second question seeks to understand whether there is an optimal amount of privacy 
protection, both from an individual point of view and for the society as a whole. This is a 
complex issue that also includes the analysis of the value extracted from data, that most of the 
time is combined between them. The third question, related to the previous one, tries to go 
further: if and once an "optimal" amount of privacy can be identified, who should be 
responsible for achieving that certain amount? Should the individuals be responsible through 
their behavior and informed choices? Should the corporate market self-regulate itself and 
compete on privacy? Or should it be the government through its regulation? 
For these reasons, research on the economics of privacy still has ample room for growth in 
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